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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the effect of commissioning programs on career progression for 
Navy surface warfare officers (SWOs). This study specifies and estimates three 
multivariate regression models to analyze the relationship between commissioning source 
and officer performance using retention and promotion to O-4 as performance measures. 
As a measure of retention, we used retention after expiration of the initial minimum 
service requirement. The data was acquired from Officer Master File (OMF) via the Navy 
Econometric Modeling (NEM) online data system. The file contained 10,295 
observations. All observations were surface warfare officers who were before the 
promotion board between fiscal years 1994 through 2004. The data contained information 
about demographics, professional and educational background, and separation and 
promotion information for officers. 
 
The analysis of all three multivariate regression models indicates that 
commissioning source is a significant determinant of retention and promotion for the 
SWO community. Contrary to the initial assumption, while OCS graduates have the 
highest probability of staying in the SW community, USNA graduates have the lowest 
probability. Although USNA graduates were initially expected to have higher promotion 
rates, the results suggest that they are less likely to promote to the grade of O-4 than 
officers commissioned through the NROTC-contract program. However, USNA 
graduates have a higher probability of promotion than officers from OCS, the NROTC-
scholarship program, and from “other sources.” 
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The strength of an army is measured by the value of its officers and its commanders. 
       — Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
A. BACKGROUND 
Throughout history, officers have been the most important personnel of the armed 
forces for all nations. The overall quality of military is highly dependent on the quality of 
its officers. Armed forces want to recruit and retain the best individuals for its officer 
corps (Korkmaz, 2005). Attracting and keeping valuable personnel has been a great 
difficulty for every military. The U.S. Navy annually consumes a great amount of money 
to educate and train candidates for commissioning as officers. The United States Naval 
Academy (USNA), Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC), Officer Candidate 
School (OCS), and enlisted-to-officer commissioning programs are major commissioning 
sources of surface warfare officers (SWOs) (Korkmaz, 2005). 
Each of these commissioning sources has a different role in officer production. 
When comparing these sources, it should be taken into consideration that their different 
roles provide advantages and disadvantages. USNA provides a constant and reliable flow 
of well-trained officers to the Navy; however, these officers cost more than those from 
other commissioning sources because of their long and intensive training. Ideally, upon 
completing a difficult four-year physical and educational course load, individuals 
graduating from the Naval Academy will have higher willingness to stay in the Navy for 
long-term careers (Korkmaz, 2005). NROTC provides officers with the freedom to 
choose their college or university, yet still graduate as a commissioned officer in the 
United States Navy. NROTC is less costly than USNA, but cannot match the quality of 
military training. After graduation, OCS provides officers with a short, rigorous training 
program designed to move them quickly to the fleet. The flexibility of the OCS program 
enables the Navy to increase officer production quickly, especially during periods of 
national emergency (CNA, 2008). Ultimately, each of these commissioning sources plays 
a different, but vital role in the nation’s defense. 
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A comparison of commissioning sources is helpful in determining the most 
effective method for obtaining and retaining officers. Since recruiting and training of 
officers requires money, experience, and resources, retaining high-performing officers for 
longer periods in the Navy is of great importance. Therefore, if one commissioning 
source has greater success in retention and promotion, the accession of officers from this 
source should be increased. 
Of course, such a policy change would have to depend on a rigorous cost-benefit 
analysis. A conflict may be faced when the source has both the highest levels of retention 
and highest cost to recruit and train. In reality, there is both a budget for officer 
accessions and an approved number of officers required at each rank to maintain force 
structure. This study focuses specifically on the effects of the various commissioning 
sources on the retention and promotion of officers. 
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the effects of commissioning sources on 
the career progression of surface warfare officers in the U.S. Navy. The study will 
measure the determinants of retention and promotion and will enable decision makers to 
trade off retention and commissioning costs. The study will renew the results of prior 
studies and facilitate comparisons among commissioning programs. Decision makers will 
have information with which to conduct cost-benefit analyses of commissioning sources 
and decide the optimal mix for SWOs. Furthermore, decision makers can investigate why 
the various sources have different retention and promotion rates and improve the 
commissioning sources. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 Does the commissioning source have any effect on retention at the end of 
initial obligated service? 
 Is there a difference in the rate of promotion to the grade of O-4 among 
SWOs from the different commissioning sources? 
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D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The thesis includes an overview of commissioning sources and the promotion 
system for SWOs in the U.S. Navy. Officers who stay beyond their initial obligated 
service and those who stay long enough to promote to the grade of O-4 will be the focus 
of this study. The study will construct two models: one for retention after minimum 
service requirement (MSR) and one for promotion to the grade of O-4. The original data 
set used in the analysis was taken from the Navy econometric modeling (NEM) system 
and includes SWOs commissioned between 1994 and 2004. The scope of the study 
includes an analysis of retention and promotion decisions, an interpretation of the 
statistical results, and recommendations for decision makers. 
The thesis does not conduct a cost-benefit analysis to estimate the marginal cost 
of commissioning an officer from each source; nor does it control for other performance 
measures such as fitness reports and evaluation reports, as they are not available in the 
data set. Therefore, findings may not be sufficient to determine the optimal mix of officer 
accessions from the various commissioning sources. However, this research does provide 
policymakers with useful information about the retention and promotion tendencies of 
SWOs. 
The research assumes a significant relationship between commissioning sources 
and officer performance. Differences in partial effects of commissioning sources on 
performance are also expected. Since USNA provides longer military training and 
acculturation, academy graduates are expected to stay longer. 
E. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter ΙΙ provides relevant literature about 
the area of concern. This section includes useful information about commissioning 
sources, career development, retention issues, and the promotion system for SWOs. It 
also reviews relevant past studies. Chapter III introduces the data, presents a preliminary 
analysis of the variables, and discusses the methodology of the study. Chapter IV covers 
the results of the multivariate analysis of retention and promotion models. Chapter V 
summarizes the study. In this section, the significance of the results is discussed and 
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compared with results of previous studies. We discuss the significance of the results and 
compare them with prior studies. This chapter also includes recommendations for further 
research. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
According to Denmond et al. (2007), surface warfare (SW) is the Navy 
community that has the missions of naval presence, sea control, and projection of power 
ashore by use of surface ships. Surface warfare is the oldest community in the Navy and 
today has just over 8,000 officers. Surface warfare officers are responsible for operating 
surface ships at sea, including managing onboard systems and personnel. They are the 
“ship drivers” of the fleet. The peak point of a SWO’s career path would typically be to 
command a ship at sea. Officers who desire to promote to higher leadership positions 
must pass through a variety of challenging career milestones, which train and prepare 
them for such critical commanding responsibilities (Denmond et al. 2007). 
 
Figure 1.   Surface Warfare Officer Breast Insignia  
This chapter focuses on commissioning programs, career development, and the 
retention and promotion of SWOs. The first section discusses the commissioning sources, 
which consist of the United States Naval Academy (USNA), Navy Reserve Officer 
Training Corps (NROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS) and enlisted-to-officer 
commissioning programs. The second section covers the career path of SWOs to include 
critical retention points. The third section reviews current retention issues among SWOs, 
including factors that influence retention. The fourth section highlights SWO promotion 
zones and timing, board process, and promotion as a measure of performance. The fifth 
section discusses relevant prior studies, and the chapter concludes with a summary. 
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B. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER COMMISSIONING PROGRAMS  
There are various ways to become a commissioned officer in the United States 
Navy. A college degree is required for commissioning. An officer’s commission is an 
appointment by the president of the United States. This can be seen as a contract between 
the individual and his country to perform military duties. There are two types of 
commission: regular and reserve. A regular commissioned officer commits to serve in the 
military full time. A reserve commission may be full time or part time. Every officer 
graduating from one of the commissioning sources receives a reserve commission. With 
the approval of a new law in September 30, 1996, an officer can earn a regular 
commission only after completing at least one year of active-duty service. (Thirtle, 2001)  
In order to become an officer, an individual may join or consider one of the four 
commissioning sources: 
1. The United States Naval Academy (USNA) 
2. The Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) 
3. Officer Candidate School (OCS) 
4. Enlisted-to-officer commissioning programs  
The following two figures exhibit accession rates for unrestricted line (URL) and 
SWO communities by commissioning programs. Figure 2 shows that NROTC is the main 
source of officers by providing 40% on average. USNA is second with about 30%, OCS 
provides an average of 20%, and the enlisted-to-officer programs are last, at 10%.  
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Figure 2.   SWO Accessions (From: CNA, 2008) 
Figure 3 shows that OCS provides the largest portion of URL officers by an 45% 
average accession rate. NROTC is second, with a 30% accession rate, while USNA is 
last, with a 25% average accession rate. 
 
Figure 3.   URL Officer Accessions (From: CNA, 2008) 
Today, regardless of the commissioning source, the main qualification to become 
an officer is a college degree. Advances in technology require most officers to have a 
strong background in science and engineering. Figure 4 exhibits the typical routes for 
becoming an officer in the military. This figure shows the diverse choices available to 
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individuals. Background and personal characteristics affect the decision of individuals on 
the path to commissioning. The following sections describe each commissioning source, 
including mission, training period, and history. 
 
Figure 4.   Typical Methods of Becoming an Officer in the Military. (From: Thirtle,  2001). 
1. The Naval Academy 
According to the U.S. Naval Academy webpage, although President John Quincy 
Adams inspired Congress to found a naval academy in 1825, the foundation of USNA 
was realized through the efforts of Secretary of the Navy George Bancroft in 1845. It was 
founded in Annapolis, Maryland, with a class of fifty midshipmen and seven professors, 
with the purpose of providing naval officers. The academic plan consisted of four years 
of academic education, with training aboard ships each summer. After this time, the 
Naval Academy grew to keep pace with the increasing need for military officers. In 1933, 
Congress authorized the Naval Academy to award Bachelor of Science degrees. (U.S. 
Naval Academy webpage) 
Although each year more than 10,000 applicants apply for admission, generally 
only 1,200 are accepted, because USNA is highly selective and capacity is limited. An 
admissions board reviews the applicant’s academic records, medical and dental health, 
physical fitness, leadership potential, and motivation. All candidates have equal 
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opportunity, but minority groups generally make up 35% and women 20% of those 
accepted (U.S. Naval Academy webpage-2013 class). 
Acceptance into the Naval Academy is based on several criteria. According to the 
USNA web page, the basic requirements are that the candidate be (U.S. Naval Academy 
webpage): 
 a United States citizen. 
 of good moral character. 
 at least 17 years of age and not older than 23 years of age on 1 July of the 
year of entry 
 unmarried 
 not pregnant 
 without dependents 
In addition to these qualifications, an applicant must be scholastically and 
medically qualified, pass the Naval Academy’s physical-aptitude examination or a 
similar test, and get an official nomination from one of several different sources. 
The nomination sources are (U.S. Naval Academy webpage): 
 U.S. senators, representatives, and delegates  
 the president of the U.S. 
 the vice president of the U.S. 
 The Navy and Marine Corps (active and reserve)  
 Reserve Officers Training Corps units 
 children of deceased or disabled veterans, of prisoners of war, or of 
servicemen missing in action 
 children of Medal of Honor awardees  
The mission of the U.S. Naval academy is: 
To develop midshipmen morally, mentally, and physically and to imbue 
them with the highest ideals of duty, honor and loyalty in order to provide 
graduates who are dedicated to a career of naval service and have potential 
for future development in mind and character to assume the highest 
responsibilities of command, citizenship and government. (U.S. Naval 
Academy webpage) 
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According to the U.S. Naval Academy webpage, to accomplish this mission, the 
Naval Academy provides an intensive four years of academic and professional training to 
midshipmen to prepare them as highly qualified naval and Marine Corps officers. 
Engineering and weapons, mathematics and science, leadership, education and officer 
development, humanities and social sciences, and professional development are the five 
main divisions of the curriculum. Midshipmen may choose to study one of the nineteen 
major fields within these five divisions. Below are the divisions and departments in 
USNA: 
 
• Division of Engineering and Weapons 
 Aerospace Engineering 
 Electrical and Computer Engineering 
 Mechanical Engineering 
 Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering 
 Weapons and Systems Engineering 




 Language and Cultures 
 Political Science 
•Division of Leadership, Education and Officer Development 
 Officer Development 
 Leadership, Ethics, and Law 
• Division of Mathematics and Science 
 Chemistry 




• Division of Professional Development 
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 Professional Programs 
 Seamanship and Navigation 
According to the U.S. Naval Academy webpage, midshipmen receive an 
academic education and military training during the four-year program at USNA. The 
program starts with “plebe summer,” seven weeks designed to make civilians adapt to the 
academy. Midshipmen undergo various training programs to enhance their military and 
leadership skills during each summer. Upon graduation, they are generally assigned to 
ships, submarines, and squadrons, with SEAL teams or Marine units. The minimum-
service requirement (MSR) for USNA graduates is five years’ active duty and three years 
in the reserve forces, starting at graduation. While all healthy graduates are 
commissioned into the Navy’s unrestricted line (URL), unhealthy graduates are generally 
commissioned into the restricted line or staff corps specialties such as intelligence, supply 
corps, or civil-engineering corps. According to a CNA (2008), adding a new midshipman 
to USNA costs $215,300. Table 1 elaborates the costs. 
Table 1. Marginal Cost of Additional Midshipman at USNA (From: CNA, 2008). 
 
 
2. The Reserve Officer Training Corps 
According to U.S. NROTC webpage, the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps 
(NROTC) program was established in 1926 to provide a comprehensive education and 
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training in the arts and sciences of naval warfare. The program provides an opportunity 
for young men to become commissioned officers. NROTC is the largest source of Navy 
and Marine Corps officers, founded to educate and train individuals as commissioned 
officers for the unrestricted-line naval reserve and Marine reserve corps. The mission of 
the NROTC program is: 
To develop midshipmen mentally, morally and physically, and to imbue 
them with the highest ideals of duty, and loyalty, and with the core values 
of honor, courage and commitment in order to commission college 
graduates as naval officers who possess a basic professional background, 
are motivated toward careers in the naval service, and have a potential for 
future development in mind and character so as to assume the highest 
responsibilities of command, citizenship and government. (U.S. NROTC 
webpage) 
The NROTC program started in 1926 with only six participating universities: 
University of California at Berkeley, Georgia Institute of Technology, Northwestern 
University, University of Washington, and Harvard and Yale universities. NROTC is 
now provided at over 150 colleges and universities that either host NROTC units or have 
cross-town enrollment agreements with a host university. Some applicants for the 
program are selected through a highly competitive national selection process and 
awarded scholarships. They receive full tuition and other financial benefits at many of the 
country's leading colleges and universities. (U.S. NROTC webpage) 
According to O'Brien (2002), the basic requirements for an applicant to the 
NROTC program are that he or she must:  
 be a United States citizen 
 be 17–23 years old 
 be a high-school graduate 
 be physically qualified 
 have excellent moral character, 
 have no record of military or civilian offenses 
 gain admission to a college that sponsors an NROTC unit 
 have a minimum SAT test score of 530 verbal and 520 math or minimum 
ACT test score of 22 in both English and math  
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Active-duty enlisted sailors can also attend NROTC programs. There are two 
types of NROTC programs—scholarship or non-scholarship—with similar minimum 
service requirements. Upon graduation and commissioning, non-scholarship graduates 
must serve in the Navy for eight years, of which three and a half years must be in active 
service. Scholarship graduates have the same MSR, eight years, of which four must be in 
active service (Korkmaz, 2005).  
Table 2 exhibits the cost of an additional midshipman to NROTC, which was 
$135,000 in 2008. 
Table 2. Marginal Cost of One Scholarship NROTC Midshipman (From: CNA, 
2008). 
 
3. Officer Candidate Schools 
The Navy Officer Candidate School (OCS) is the most flexible of the 
commissioning sources, allowing the Navy to fill gaps in the officer corps easily to meet 
service needs. OCS is also the fastest and easiest way for civilians and non-commissioned 
officers to become commissioned officers (Thirtle, 2001). According to the U.S. Navy 
OCS webpage, OCS is stationed at the Naval Aviation School Command in Pensacola, 
Florida. In order to become a commissioned officer, students have to complete thirteen-
week training through OCS. OCS provides academic and military courses and physical-
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fitness training to prepare students for future deployments. According to U.S. Navy OCS 
webpage, the thirteen weeks are very demanding, both physically and psychologically. 
Course subjects include naval operations, orientation and administration, naval history, 
strategic deterrence, shipboard management, combat systems, ship control, and surface 
ships. U.S. Navy OCS webpage states that a candidate for admission to the Navy OCS 
must: 
 be a U.S. citizen 
 possess good moral character 
 be under age 35 for all designators 
 exhibit health and physical fitness 
 have a bachelor’s degree from an accredited institution 
 take the Officer Aptitude Rating (OAR) examination. 
Upon successfully completing the course, officers can be assigned as naval 
aviators, naval flight officers, surface warfare officers, submarine-warfare officers, 
special-operations officers, special-warfare officers, supply-corps officers, civil-
engineering corps officers, aerospace-maintenance duty officers, intelligence officers, 
cryptology officers, public-affairs officers, and oceanographers (U.S. Navy OCS 
webpage). 
In the Table 3, the cost of an additional candidate for OCS is estimated to be 
$21,600 in 2008. 
Table 3. Marginal Cost of an OCS Candidate (From: CNA, 2008). 
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4. Enlisted-to-Officer Commissioning Programs 
Enlisted-to-officer commissioning programs provide opportunity for exceptional 
enlisted service members to be commissioned as officers in the U.S. Navy by joining 
NROTC or OCS programs. A college degree is required. To make it more understandable 
and practical to apply, the Navy recently combined most of the enlisted commissioning 
programs into a single program, Seaman to Admiral-21 (STA-21) (U.S. Navy Seaman-to-
Admiral Program webpage). According to the U.S. Navy Seaman-to-Admiral Program 
webpage, the STA is a commissioning program in which sailors keep their benefits, pay, 
and privileges as active-duty members while receiving a scholarship to obtain their 
degree and a commission as naval officers. Thanks to STA-21, outstanding active-duty 
sailors can get a college education and become commissioned officers. 
The following enlisted-to-officer commissioning programs were combined to 
form Seaman to Admiral-21 (U.S. Navy Seaman-to-Admiral Program webpage): 
 Seaman to Admiral 
 Enlisted Commissioning Program (ECP) 
 Aviation Enlisted Commissioning Program (AECP) 
 Nuclear Enlisted Commissioning Program (NECP) 
 Civil-Engineer Corps Enlisted Commissioning Program (CECECP) 
 Fleet Accession to Naval Reserve-Officer Training Corps (NROTC) 
 Broadened Opportunity for Officer Selection and Training (BOOST) 
Before STA-21, some service members had to pay for tuition and other 
educational expenses, while some had to be away from active duty. By contrast, the STA-
21 program keeps all participants on active duty at their current enlisted pay grade— that 
is, they will receive all the pay, allowances, benefits, and privileges they currently get and 
still be eligible for enlisted promotion while in the program.  
According to U.S. Navy Seaman-to-Admiral Program webpage, to be eligible for 
STA-21, sailors must  
 be a citizen of the United States 
 be recommended by their commanding officer 
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 have good moral character 
 be serving on active duty in the U.S. Navy or Naval Reserve, including 
Training and Administration of the Reserves (TAR), Selected Reserves 
(SELRES), and Navy Reservists on active duty except for those on active 
for training (ACDUTRA) to include annual training (AT) and initial active 
duty for training (I-ACDUTRA) 
 be a high-school graduate 
 be able to complete the requirements for a baccalaureate degree in 36 
months or less 
 be able to complete degree requirements and be commissioned prior to 
their 31st birthday 
 maintain a cumulative grade-point average of 2.5 or better on a 4.0 scale 
while enrolled in STA-21 
 have a SAT or ACT test score 
 meet physical commissioning standards 
 have no record of certain court or disciplinary actions 
 have passed a personal-fitness assessment  
 Individuals who have already obtained their baccalaureate degree are not 
eligible for STA-21 and should apply directly for Officer Candidate 
School (OCS). 
Graduates of STA-21 have to serve five- to eight years in active duty, according 
to the type of the service upon commissioning. When they complete their program, they 
are commissioned as an ensign in the United States Naval Reserve. After graduation, 
newly commissioned ensigns are sent to initial training for their officer community (U.S. 
Navy Seaman-to-Admiral-Program webpage). 
C. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER CAREER DEVELOPMENT 
According to Carman (2008), although the typical SWO career path was 
standardized and deviations from the norm were discouraged, the current career path has 
added flexibility and alternative opportunities, due to changing requirements in the SWO 
community. When officers earn a commission in the Navy and begin their career path as 
a career designated SWO, they report immediately to a surface ship. They do not attend 
any formal school; instead, they are expected to learn their job through on-the-job 
training (OJT). 
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A newly commissioned officer generally spends a total of 45 months during his 
first and second division-officer (DIVO) tours. Upon completing the first and second 
DIVO tours, the officer reaches an exit port, where he has to decide to stay or leave 
active military service at the 48-month mark (60 months for USNA graduates). If he 
decides to stay, he has two options: not taking the SWO retention bonus, while signing on 
for a two- to three-year shore-duty assignment, or taking the SWO bonus and obligating 
himself for the next six years as a Navy SWO (Browning & Burr, 2009).  
Figure 5 illustrates the whole career progression of a SWO. The following 
sections discuss the career opportunities for surface warfare officers, including potential 
ports of exit.  
 
Figure 5.   Typical Career Progression for SWO (From: SWO Spouse Brief) 
1. Accession through Executive Officer (XO) Tour 
Like all naval officers, the surface warfare officer typically comes into the Navy 
with a four-year college degree. Most of these junior surface warfare officers go directly 
to sea after graduating from their undergraduate institutions to do their first-tour division-
officer job (Carman, 2008). Historically, officers attended the six-month, SWO division-
officer school (SWOSDOC) in Newport, Rhode Island, before beginning their first sea 
tour. But this changed in 2003; officers in year-group 2003 were sent directly to their first 
sea tour after commissioning. SWOSDOC was replaced by computer-based and on-the-
job training aboard ship (called “SWOS at Sea”), followed by three weeks at SWOS in 
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Newport after about eighteen months (Carman, 2008). In addition to completing SWOS 
at Sea, division officers (DIVOs) are required to earn their Officer of the Deck Underway 
(OOD U/W) qualification before continuing to SWOS for a three-week validation course, 
taught in the classroom with simulators (Carman, 2008). 
According to Denmond et al. (2007), during the division-officer tour, surface 
warfare division officers are supposed to learn their jobs and improve their leadership 
skills by being assigned to a shipboard division. SWO division-officer tours are designed 
to provide the hands-on training and development necessary for new officers entering the 
fleet. While the first DIVO tour takes twenty-four months, the second one typically lasts 
eighteeen months. Generally, DIVO tours are fulfilled in different ships. The main 
purpose of the first division-officer tour is to develop the junior surface warfare officer’s 
abilities in a variety of areas. Especially it aims to make him a qualified officer of the 
deck (OOD) and have sufficient expertise in his career field to become a SWO. After this 
tour, officers deserve to wear the surface warfare officer breast insignia (Denmond et al. 
2007). Upon finishing the three-week course, junior SWOs come back to their ship to 
complete their surface warfare officer qualification before finishing their first DIVO tour. 
This qualification process is shown in Figure 6 (Carman, 2008).  
 
Figure 6.   SWO Qualifications During the First Division-Officer Tour (From: Carman, 
2008) 
Upon completing the first DIVO tour, SWOs are assigned to second DIVO billets 
on different Navy warships. In this tour, SWOs can choose to continue in the same ship 
or be assigned to another ship to fulfill the second-tour division-officer job (Denmond et 
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al. 2007). They perform different, more specialized jobs from the first tour, requiring 
greater expertise and responsibility and yielding a more diversified background. Typical 
second-tour jobs are navigator, training officer, or main propulsion assistant (MPA), 
depending on the type of platform assigned. These second-tour jobs facilitate the 
achievement of additional qualifications, such as engineering officer of the watch 
(EOOW) and tactical-action officer (TAO) (Denmond et al. 2007).  
Surface warfare officers may serve in a variety of locations around the world. 
However, most of their first- and second-tour assignments are in major fleet-
concentration areas, such as Norfolk, VA; San Diego, CA; Bremerton, WA; Mayport, 
FL; Pearl Harbor, HI; and Yokosuka, Japan. Upon successfully completing their two 
afloat division-officer tours, at approximately four years of commissioned service (YCS), 
surface warfare officers are eligible for their first shore duty (Denmond et al. 2007). 
According to Carman (2008), various shore billets are available, including graduate-
education institutions and various staff duties. SWOs also may complete Joint 
Professional Military Education (JPME), Phase I, during this period ashore. Typically, 
junior SWOs complete their MSR while on their second afloat division-officer tour or, at 
the latest, on their first shore tour. At this point of exit, most of these officers have to 
decide whether to stay in the Navy. They may decide to leave the Navy, transfer to 
another community, or continue the SWO career path.  
Faced with manning shortages at the department-head level during the past ten 
years, the Navy has introduced surface warfare officer continuation pay (SWOCP). This 
special pay is designed to encourage eligible personnel to pursue their SWO careers as 
afloat department heads, thereby increasing the SWO retention rate in department-head 
tours. If officers take the SWOCP, they have to complete department-head school, 
followed by two back-to-back, eighteen-month, department-head tours afloat (Denmond 
et al. 2007). 
 If they choose to stay beyond the first shore-duty assignment, surface warfare 
officers are supposed to report to SWOS for six-month department-head (DH) school. 
Upon graduation, SWOs are assigned to their first DH tour at sea. In addition to normal 
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duties, DHs are also expected to qualify as TAOs. Moreover, high performing DHs may 
have the chance to screen for lieutenant-commander command. (Carman, 2008) 
Carman (2008) mentions that SWOs report for their second DH assignment at 
approximately nine years of commissioned service (YCS). Some officers can participate 
in IA assignments instead of the traditional second DH assignment. When they complete 
their first DH tour, officers selected for lieutenant-commander command attend 
commanding-officer (CO) training at SWOS before assuming executive-officer (XO) and 
subsequent CO duties.  
According to Carman (2008), after they complete the required DH-tour 
obligation, midgrade SWOs assume various shore-duty assignments, such as graduate 
education, Junior War College, joint-duty assignments, subspecialty tours, and staff 
billets. During this period, since the commitment from the junior SWO CSRB and 
SWOCP expire, SWOs reach another career point at which to decide to stay or leave.  
Additionally, lieutenant commanders (LCDRs) can apply for one of six specialty 
career-path programs, which include (Carman, 2008): 
 anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) 
 anti-submarine warfare 
 missile defense 
 mine-warfare specialist 
 shore-installation management 
 strategic sealift (MSC/MPF) 
Acceptance into one of these programs provides the opportunity for executive-
officer, special-mission (XO-SM) assignment (Carman, 2008). 
Figure 7 displays the current SWO career path from an officer’s commissioning through 





Figure 7.   SWO Career Path From Accession Through Executive Officer (XO) Tour (From: 
Carman, 2008) 
2. Commanding-Officer (CO) Tour through Major Command 
If surface warfare officers decide to keep on the traditional SWO career path, they 
then screen for commander command. If selected, they go to SWOS to complete the CO 
course before beginning command at sea. After completing this course, they are assigned 
to their respective warships as XO and then they eventually “fleet up” to CO aboard the 
same ship (Carman, 2008). If they are not selected for commander command, they are 
deployed in various sea and shore billets. Upon completion of a commander-command 
tour, SWOs assume a variety of assignments such as Senior War College, joint-duty 
assignments, subspecialty tours, or staff billets. Since naval officers become eligible for 
retirement at twenty YCS, they reach a major port of exit (Carman, 2008). They become 
eligible for lifetime military retirement pay and benefits at this point. However, if SWOs 
screen for major command, they can expect another command opportunity at 
approximately 22.5 YCS. After this point, the SWO career path becomes more tentative, 
because some SWOs compete for flag rank while others choose to retire (Carman, 2008). 
Figure 8 illustrates the senior portion of the SWO career path, with the top gray 
bar continuing the cumulative years of commissioned service. 
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Figure 8.   SWO Career Path from CO Through Major Command (From: Carman, 2008) 
3. Individual Augmentation (IA) and Global War on Terrorism Support 
Assignments (GSA) during Shore Duty 
According to Carman (2008), SWOs can face individual augmentation (IA) and 
Global War On Terrorism support assignments (GSA) at different points along the career 
path during shore-duty intervals. These assignments are generally outside the officer’s 
specialty and require long periods of deployment. Since they are not compensated with a 
shore-duty assignment extension to make up for lost time at home, officers just come 
back to their previous shore-duty assignment to complete the time left (Carman, 2008). It 
is a low possibility to assume these assignments during shore-duty periods. On the other 
hand, GSA billets are offered to officers as regular assignments at the beginning of the 
shore-duty slating window, thus increasing the “predictability” of such assignments for 
officers and their families (Carman, 2008). 
 Upon completion of GSA requirements, officers assume other shore-duty jobs, if 
career timing permits. Figure 9 shows a snapshot of the number of SWOs filling IA or 
GSA billets by rank, with the percentage of total officers participating in these programs 
depicted on the right y-axis. The majority of surface warfare community IA and GSA 
assignments affect lieutenants (O-3) and lieutenant commanders (O-4). 
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Figure 9.   Snapshot of Surface Warfare Officers Filling IA and GSA Billets (From: SWO 
XO/CO Mentoring Brief 2009) 
Figure 10 displays the distribution of SWOs who filled GSA billets throughout 
the world. As illustrated in this figure, Iraq and Afghanistan have the largest portions of 
these billets. 
 
Figure 10.   GSA in Terms of Countries (From: SWO Career Planning Seminar, 2010) 
D. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER RETENTION 
Retention is defined as the voluntary decision of officers to stay in the military 
after their MSR. The services set annual goals for retention to meet the number of 
officers required to carry out missions. Since manning shortages can cause great troubles 
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within the military personnel system, the military services watchfully track the retention 
of officers. On the one hand, if few officers are retained, the military faces problems from 
a lack of experienced leaders and decreased efficiency; on the other hand, the retention of 
too many officers decreases promotion opportunities and causes many officers to leave 
involuntary. Unlike nearly all other organizations, the DoD relies completely on its own 
manpower, and higher-ranking members must be retained and promoted from lower 
ranks because the military services have a closed personnel system. While most other 
organizations can and do hire from the outside at all levels, DoD has to obtain required 
personnel from its own closed system by accession and promotion through all levels. 
Therefore, if the military services fail to meet recruiting or retention goals at lower levels 
in a given year, they will have significant problems in producing experienced leaders for 
subsequent years (GAO-Military Compensation, 2010).  
There are many reasons Navy personnel voluntarily leave. The most significant of 
these are pay, age, tenure, number of dependents, organizational commitment, and 
satisfaction with work, coworkers, and personnel who leave by their own choice 
(Korkmaz, 2005). Stoker and Crawford (2008) analyzed the SWO community and found 
that mentoring was an indirect retention factor. They also found a positive correlation 
between experienced officers and junior-officer retention. Regardless of the community, 
retention issues are complex and span many factors; thus, there are different retention 
views and theories. 
1. Recruiting and Retention 
As an organization, the U.S. Navy has to compete for manpower with civilian 
organizations and companies and other military branches. To attract and retain talent, the 
Navy must offer competitive wages and tangible and intangible benefits. Wages consist 
of basic pay, allowances, special and incentive pays, annual pay adjustments, and tax 
advantages (Carman, 2008). Tangible benefits include medical and dental care and 
reduced-cost life-insurance policies. Intangible benefits include military-specific and 
general training, education, and the opportunity to serve one’s country. When people 
decide on a career, they always take into account compensation. In the same manner, 
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individuals compare differences between military and civilian costs and benefits before 
deciding to join the Navy or to remain in the civilian sector (Carman, 2009). 
The entry port for the Navy is accession sources. Anyone can become a 
commissioned officer through a variety of avenues, such as the U.S. Naval Academy, 
Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS) or 
enlisted-to-officer commissioning programs. Since lateral entry is very limited due to the 
specificity of most military skills, recruiting high-quality officers at the entry level is very 
crucial (Asch & Warner, 2001). However, the task of recruiting quality officers can be 
tough, as the Navy must compete with civilian and other governmental organizations for 
the same talent pool. Moreover, the frequency of deployments and outside opportunities 
in the civilian sector makes recruitment much harder than before.  
In 2008, Navy Personnel, Research, Studies, and Technology (NPRST) carried 
out a retention “quick poll” to determine career attitudes, needs, and retention intentions 
of Navy officers and enlisted. Factors assessed in the poll included: 
 reasons for joining the Navy  
 impact of various potential incentives on current career intentions  
 satisfaction with Navy job  
 satisfaction with mentoring, career progression, promotions, etc.  
 current career intentions 
In order to determine contributing factors to joining the Navy, the question below was 
asked (the responses are exhibited in the Table 4). While base pay is the most important 
contributing factor, the ability to choose the next assignment is also very crucial. The 
least important contributing factors are subsidy for daycare and “other” factors. 
Q13. Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which the following 





Table 4. Top 10 Factors Contributing to Joining the Navy (From: NPRST Quick 
Poll) 
 
Military and civilian organizations have always been challenged in retaining their 
personnel. When an employee leaves an organization, this separation may be costly. 
Therefore, organizations focus considerable attention on avoiding unwanted disruption 
caused by attrition (Clemens, 2002).  
Attrition is more problematic for the military than for other organizations. Due to 
its hierarchical personnel system, personnel separations have a much greater impact on 
organizational performance and stability than separations in a civilian organization. In the 
Navy, middle- and senior-grade officers cannot be replaced from the civilian world; 
instead, they must be filled from promotions of junior officers. It takes time and money 
before and after commissioning to produce a qualified and experienced officer. 
Moreover, attrition reduces officer quality, productivity, and recruitment (Clemens, 
2002). Therefore, many studies have analyzed which commissioning source is most 
effective in retaining officers.    
In the Navy, officers have a minimum service obligation after commissioning, 
depending on their commissioning source and the specific officer community to which 
they are assigned. While the MSR for NROTC graduates is four years, it is five years for 
Naval Academy graduates. After the MSR has expired, officers reach a port of exit at 
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which they must decide whether to stay or leave the Navy. At these points of exit, the 
Navy must attract a certain number of officers in accordance with its manning needs. 
If a specific officer community is having problems in convincing the required 
number of officers to remain, retention bonuses and special pays are offered to enhance 
the officers’ willingness to stay. Generally, the programs oblige receivers to stay for a 
specified period. According to Carman (2008), SWOs are offered $50,000 through the 
Surface warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) retention program for committing to 
two department-head tours, which add approximately five to six years of obligation past 
the first port of exit. Additionally, SWOs are offered $25,000 through the Junior SWO 
Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) for a similar commitment. SWOCP and Junior 
SWO CSRB can be taken at the same time, so SWOs are actually offered $75,000 to 
remain through two department-head tours—totaling nine- to eleven years of 
commissioned service (Carman, 2008). 
Also, advanced educational opportunities play a key role in convincing SWOs 
approaching a port-of-exit decision to stay. When they are accepted for an educational 
program, they have to extend their service based on program length. For example, having 
a graduate education from the Naval Postgraduate School corresponds to a three-year 
commitment (Carman, 2008). The Navy uses both monetary and educational incentives 
as officer-retention tools. However, if officers are not under an obligation associated with 
a bonus or educational benefit, they are free to leave or stay. Officers’ retention decisions 
are affected by external factors such as the unemployment rate during these critical 
decision points. Meanwhile, the structure of the military hierarchy is designed to tolerate 
a reasonable loss of officers at early ports of exit (Carman, 2008). 
2. Factors Influencing Retention 
a. Human Capital 
According to Lehner (2008), human-capital theory is based on the same 
basic principles as the general theory of investment. When organizations invest in their 
capital, they expect future profits from the investment. For example, workers invest in 
themselves by seeking education, migrating, and spending on health care. Organizations 
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make the decision to invest in their employees to enhance their productivity. This 
investment includes the education and training of employees. 
An organization’s primary goal is to motivate employees and increase 
their productivity by providing incentives. In the meantime, organizations also have to 
follow the market and overall economy to determine their policies (Lehner, 2008). While 
investing in human capital, organizations face many difficulties, the most important being 
that employees may leave the organization prior to fulfilling the return on the human-
capital investment made by the organization (Lehner, 2008). 
As an organization, the Navy operates within the same human-capital 
constraint as any other institution. Both are dependent on sufficiently trained and 
experienced labor. According to Ehrenberg and Smith (2006), one of the human-capital 
investments that business organizations and individuals engage in is education and 
training. There are three types of cost associated with investment in human capital and 
each of them falls into the categories of either specific or general training. These costs are 
direct expenses, lost earnings, and psychic losses. Direct costs are the cost of education 
and training. Lost earnings emerge as a result of time spent on training, not on work. 
Psychic costs are intangible and are the result of mentally challenging or tedious 
programs. While general training includes work skills that employees can use under 
various employers, specific training is focused on improving skills that will benefit the 
employer providing the training. Psychic costs are generally associated with training and 
education in both civilian and military organizations and they cause stress and pressure 
on employees. Since SWOs generally receive education and training during the standard 
workday, they are not supposed to do some of their daily work, and this opportunity 
decreases these costs. While civilian institutions generally make employees pay for their 
general training expenses, the Navy bears practically 100% of firm specific and general-
training costs (Carman, 2008).  
When civilian employers invest in human capital, they seek a return on 
investment through increased worker productivity and a commitment from the employee 
until the employer recoups his investment (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2006). According to 
Carman (2008), while some officers may face additional service obligations, others may 
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serve such obligations concurrently with existing service commitments. This increases 
benefits to these service members and decreases return on investment for the Navy. 
Moreover, the impact of human-capital training investment on individual promotion 
opportunities, annual pay, or even retention cannot be seen immediately. The first two 
officer-promotion steps are carried out systematically with time in service and they 
depend little on performance measures. Only beyond the rank of lieutenant (O-3), do 
promotions become dependent on individual performance and human-capital growth. 
Therefore, the Navy cannot determine the long-range effects of human-capital 
investments (Carman, 2008).  
b. Compensation 
In addition to factors such as learning a new skill, serving in a favorite 
location, staying at the same location, or traveling abroad, the overall economy has a 
great impact on stay–leave decisions. If the economy is growing rapidly, the Navy may 
face retention problems. On the contrary, when there is an economic crisis throughout the 
country, retention rate exceeds expectations. Generally, compensation and professional 
development are major drivers of retention in the Navy. In order to understand the 
correlation between compensation and retention, it is essential to gain a historical 
perspective.  
According to Asch et al. (2005) study, the Navy faced retention problems 
due to several reasons during the 1990s. At that time, a robust civilian economy provided 
attractive opportunities to military personnel, especially to well-educated individuals and 
those in highly technical areas. Additionally, issues of fairness were rampant in military 
compensation. Congress tried to overcome this problem by the FY 2000 National 
Defense Authorization Act. This act raised military pay, increased bonus ceilings, 
reformed military retirement-benefit options, and increased special pays. 
Military compensation consists of a mix of cash, noncash benefits, and 
deferred compensation, and has been one of the primary tools used by the DoD to recruit 
and retain service members since the military transitioned to an all-volunteer force in 
1973. Since the transition, military pay and benefits have progressively increased. 
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Historically, the largest component of military compensation is basic pay, allotted to 
personnel according to their rank and years of service. Over the years, a number of 
additional benefits have been added to basic pay—some of which may be postponed until 
after the completion of active-duty service. Figure 11 illustrates the distinctions in the 
type of military compensation afforded to active-duty service members (GAO-Military 
Compensation, 2010). 
 
Figure 11.   Active Duty Military Pay and Benefits According to Type of Compensation 
(From: GAO-Military Compensation, 2010) 
Current DoD policy allows the military services to use retention bonuses 
as a tool to meet DoD personnel requirements. When other alternatives are inadequate, 
impractical, or less cost effective, monetary bonuses can be used. Monetary 
compensation should be given to personnel whose performance is valuable in 
accomplishing missions (Department of Defense, 2005). The current directive states that 
financial incentives are just one element with which to control personnel inventory, and 
should not be a substitute for good planning and management. 
According to Carman (2008), in 1999, the Secretary of the Navy 
authorized Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP). Today, there are four 




more senior officers, one, called the expanded SWOCP, is for department heads (O-3 and 
O-4) who are still fit for sea duty. To be eligible for a SWOCP bonus, an officer must 
(Browning & Burr, 2009): 
 be qualified and serve as a surface warfare officer 
 be selected for an assignment as a Department Head on a surface 
vessel and offered a contract by PERS 41 
 complete any service commitment incurred through the officer’s 
original commissioning program 
 be able to complete the afloat department-head tours or a single 
longer tour as assigned by PERS 41 
 be assigned to fill department-head sequencing-plan billets 
 apply prior to graduation from department-head school 
Another inducement is the senior SWOCSRB, or senior SWO bonus. The 
senior SWO bonus is aimed at O-5s and O-6s who serve in critical positions identified by 
the CNO. Of the four bonuses, the expanded SWOCP and senior CSRB can be identified 
as more critical, since it takes ten to fifteen years to “grow” a midgrade (O–4) SWO or 
fifteen to twenty years for a control-grade (O-5) SWO (Carman, 2008).  
c. Demographic Factors 
Demographic factors such as age, marital status, race, gender, dependent 
status, and educational background also affect the stay–leave decision. Officers with 
higher ages at commissioning may be considered more experienced and more productive. 
Increased productivity would indicate higher levels of professional success over less 
productive officers. Higher levels of success will likely lead to more satisfaction with the 
job and longer service time than that of officers commissioned when younger. 
The literature also shows that ethnicity affects the retention of officers. 
Minorities tend to stay in the service longer than white officers. In most of the literature, 
females are more likely to leave because they are more likely to experience interrupted 
careers, mostly because of family responsibilities. Married officers tend to have longer 
careers. 
 32
Since the repeal of the Combat Exclusion Act (CEA), women have been 
allowed to access to the aviation and surface warfare communities. In fact, if women 
access through USNA or the NROTC scholarship program, they are essentially required 
to access to the unrestricted line. Since the repeal of the CEA, many women officers 
come through USNA or the NROTC scholarship programs; these programs have become 
significant contributors to gender diversity (CNA study, 2008) 
Figure 12 shows women’s participation rate in the SWO community. 
While it kept the same level (2%-5%) during 1980s, it has been dramatically increasing 
since the 1990s. 
 
Figure 12.   Rate of Women Accessions for SWO (From: CNA study, 2008) 
Figure 13 shows the distribution of racial/ethnic diversity in the SW 
community. Whites are the largest proportion (approximately 70%) and African-
Americans, Hispanics and others share a similar participation rate (approximately 9%).  
 33
 
Figure 13.   Rate of SWO Accessions by Race/Ethnicity (From CNA study, 2008) 
In addition to the effect of commissioning source on retention, 
Karakurumer (2010) also analyzed in his thesis the effect of demographic factors on the 
retention of U.S. Air Force officers. This study finds that female, single, and white 
officers are less likely to stay than male, married, and black officers, respectively. 
Additionally, officers with more than one dependent and officers who were older at 
commissioning were found to be more likely to stay than officers with no or one 
dependent or who were younger at commissioning. Among the independent variables that 
represent the professional and educational background of individuals, officers with 
master's degrees or other graduate degrees were found to be more likely to stay than 
officers with baccalaureate degrees. This result suggests that advanced education 
increases the probability of retention.  
In 2010, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) assessed 
the retention rates of the services in terms of gender and race/ethnicity. They used data 
from FY 2000–FY 2008 in order to focus on recent officer continuation patterns. 
According to MLDC’s report, cumulative continuation-rate (CCR) curves decline as 
YOS increases. This is displayed in Figure 14 for the Navy. In all figures, women have 
lower continuation rates than men. That is, regardless of service branch, the red lines 
(women) are always lower than orange lines (men). During the first three years of 
service, men and women have similar continuation rates. By the time officers have 
completed their fourth year of service, however, gender differences in continuation rates 
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begin to emerge and increase with YOS through roughly the YOS 8 to YOS 12 points. 
By YOS 10, the difference between male and female CCRs is fifteen points in the Navy. 
In other words, although the continuation rate decreases with YOS for men and women, 
women’s continuation rates decline faster than those of men. This difference is likely the 
result of retention rather than promotion, because it emerges before the first competitive 
promotion point. Beyond YOS 12, the gender gap begins to narrow. By YOS 19, when 
officers will reach the twenty-year mark within the next year, the gap is 13 percentage 
points in the Navy. These roughly parallel cumulative continuation rates suggest that 
continuation behavior is similar for men and women during these later years. After YOS 
20, the gender gap narrows at an even faster pace. At YOS 30, the difference in CCRs 
between men and women is less than 5 percentage points.  
 
Figure 14.   Cumulative Continuation Rates for Men and Women in the Navy, FY 2000–FY 
2008 (From: MLDC, 2010) 
Officer continuation rates by race/ethnicity for the Navy are depicted in 
Figure 15. In the Navy, Asian/ Pacific Islanders (PIs), and whites have similar 




Figure 15.   Cumulative Continuation Rates in the Navy, by Racial/Ethnic Status, FY 2000–
FY 2008 (From: MLDC, 2010) 
d. Job-Related Retention Factors  
Job characteristics can be different based on the community. Deployments 
may have advantages and disadvantages that affect stay–leave decisions for sailors. 
Especially, the type and quantity of deployments may have a direct impact on decisions, 
depending on whether one enjoys the deployment experience. If individuals have 
negative experiences, it may cause them to leave the military. Studies suggest that 
deployment has a negative effect on retention. Since peacetime assignments do not carry 
the same operational stress as wartime assignments, deployments during peacetime tend 
to have a positive effect while hostile deployments have a negative effect on retention of 
midgrade officers on retention (Fricker, 2003).  
Several studies show that there is a strong correlation between high job 
satisfaction and retention, and job satisfaction strongly depends on job performance and 
leadership. Since job satisfaction, job performance, and leadership strongly relate to 
retention, they must not be ignored in any analysis of SWO retention. These 
determinants, however, are difficult to measure. Applebaum et al. (2003) defines job 
satisfaction as “a general attitude toward one’s job; the difference between the amount of 
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rewards workers actually receive and the amount they believe they should receive.” This 
may seem to imply that financial compensation is the only indicator of an employee’s 
likelihood of job satisfaction, but it is crucial to emphasize that employers also use non-
monetary rewards to motivate their employees. Within the job-satisfaction literature, job 
performance and quality of leadership are the two most significant contributors to an 
employee’s job satisfaction. In 1987, McEvoy and Cascio conducted a meta-analysis of 
twenty-four studies that analyzed the relationship between job performance and employee 
turnover. The results show that higher performance often leads to higher satisfaction, 
which in turns helps to reduce turnover. They found that job performance generally 
predicts turnover at a level comparable to organizational commitment, job satisfaction, 
and behavioral intentions (Roy, 2007).  
Since job satisfaction, quality of command leadership, deployments, and 
other job related factors are very important in stay–leave decisions of officers, NPRST 
asked some crucial questions relevant to retention issues in its retention “quick poll” to 
gauge satisfaction with the Navy. The results are exhibited in Tables 5 through 8 
and Figures 15 through 22.
Q12. How satisfied are you with your current rating/designator?  
Q33. Considering everything, how satisfied are you with your Navy job? 
Q34. Considering everything, how satisfied are you with Navy life?  
Q35. Considering everything, how satisfied are you overall with the 
support the Navy has provided for you and your family? 
Figure 16 shows that approximately 80% of officers are satisfied with 
their job; 73% are satisfied with Navy life; and 68% are satisfied with Navy’s support to 
them and their families. 
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Figure 16.   Satisfaction With Navy (From: NPRST Retention “Quick Poll”) 
Since family support for officers to stay in the Navy is also part of job 
satisfaction, it is crucial to get family opinions on stay–leave decisions. Figure 17 
indicates that while 55% of married officers’ spouses support staying, 35% of them do 
not. 
Q36. Does your spouse think you should stay on or leave active duty? 
(% of married respondents reported) 
 
Figure 17.   Spousal Support for Staying in the Navy (From: NPRST Retention “Quick Poll”) 
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The prior studies mentioned above suggest that workplace climate affects 
job satisfaction and has a substantial impact on retention. Questions about workplace 
climate and results are displayed in subsequent figures. According to Figure 18, 
satisfaction with the amount of challenge, responsibility, and freedom on the job is very 
high (80%), while feelings of accomplishment were less (73%). 
Q26. Please rate how SATISFIED or DISSATISFIED you are with the 
following aspects of your workplace climate. 
 
Figure 18.   Workplace Climate (From: NPRST Retention “Quick Poll”) 
Figure 19 shows that satisfaction with opportunity for personal growth and 
physical working conditions is 76%, and with availability of parts and supplies is 53%.  
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Figure 19.   Figure 19. Workplace Climate, Cont’d (From: NPRST Retention “Quick Poll”) 
The Poll attempted to gauge retention intentions via two separate 
questions. According to Figure 20, while 53% of officers consider staying till the next 
decision point, 23% do not consider staying and 66% of officers who want to stay until 
the next decision point, consider staying for a full career. 
Q14. How much do you AGREE or DISAGREE with the following 
statements regarding your current career plans? 
 
Figure 20.   Current Retention Intentions (From: NPRST Retention “Quick Poll”) 
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Since determining factors in retention was the main purpose of the poll, 
the question below asks the top ten reasons to stay in the Navy and results are exhibited 
in Table 5. According to Table 5, while patriotism and medical and retirement benefits 
are the top leading reasons, working relationships, the Global War on Terrorism, and 
current job satisfaction are the least important factors that lead officers to stay in the 
Navy. 
Q15. Using the scale below, please indicate whether the following factors 
have influenced you (contributed to your decision) to stay, influenced you to leave, or 
had no effect on your Navy career intentions. (% 1 - Influenced to stay, 2, or 3). 
Table 5. Top 10 Reasons To Stay In The Navy (From: NPRST Retention “Quick 
Poll” 
 
*Denotes factor unique to subgroup’s top 10 list 
In the same manner, to determine the top ten reasons for leaving the Navy, 
the question below was asked and results are displayed in the Table 6. The results show 
that deployment, and its effect on the family, has substantial weight in the decision to 
leave.  
Q15. Using the scale below, please indicate whether the following factors 
have influenced you (contributed to your decision) to stay, influenced you to leave, or 
had no effect on your Navy career intentions. (% 7 - Influenced to leave, 6, or 5). 
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Table 6. Top 10 Reasons To Leave From The Navy (From: NPRST Retention 
“Quick Poll”) 
 
*Denotes factor unique to subgroup’s top 10 list 
In order to determine the effectiveness of various incentives on retention, 
the question below was asked and answers are shown in the Table 7. The results suggest 
that increase in pay and ability to choose the next assignment, are the most effective 
incentives, while subsidy for daycare and other incentives are least effective. 
Q116. What impact would the following incentives have on your decision 
to continue your naval service? (% Greatly increase desire to stay, Increase desire to stay) 




Prior studies suggest that the quality of command leadership is very 
critical in officers’ stay–leave decisions. While good leadership may encourage officers 
to stay in the Navy, bad leadership may force them to leave. Questions were asked 
concerning leadership factors, and the results are exhibited in the following figures. 
According to Figure 21, 76%–77% of officers thought that leaders provided adequate 
support and guidance and dealt well with subordinates; 86% agreed that leaders have 
adequate training and expertise to carry out their jobs. 
Q32. How much do you AGREE or DISAGREE with the following 
statements about your overall COMMAND LEADERSHIP (CO, XO, OIC, CMC/COB)? 
 
Figure 21.   Command Leadership (From: NPRST Retention “Quick Poll”) 
Figure 22 indicates that 78% of officers were satisfied with command 
leadership and thought it responsive to needs and concerns. 
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Figure 22.   Command Leadership Cont’d (From: NPRST Retention “Quick Poll”) 
e. Commissioning Sources 
Previous studies suggest that the commissioning source has a significant 
impact on retention. Bowman (1995) developed a model to determine the effect of the 
three major commissioning sources on retention. He estimates nonlinear (probit) 
regression models of retention and promotion to predict the independent effect of 
accession sources. Results are shown in the Table 8. They represent the estimated effects 
of each commissioning program on the probability of retention and promotion for each 
URL community. The model assumes USNA as the base group and measures the effect 
of being a graduate of ROTC or OCS compared to Naval Academy graduation. For all 
URL officers, ROTC graduates are 6.2 points less likely to stay to the O-4 board than 
USNA graduates and OCS graduates are 14.9 points less likely to stay than USNA 
graduates. USNA has significantly higher retention rates than the other two 
commissioning sources, except in the NFO community. Regarding the higher-ranking 
boards, the only significant result for URL officers is that OCS has a 6.5-point lower 
probability of retention to the O-6 board.  
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Table 8. Nonlinear (Probit) Model Results (Compared to Naval Academy 
Graduates) (From: Bowman,1995) 
 
 
Mehay and Bernard (2003) conducted a study on commissioning programs 
to provide guidance for policymakers making decisions on future accessions. These 
decisions inevitably include formulating the optimal mix of officers from each of the 
commissioning sources. Their study utilizes the retention of graduates from the three 
commissioning programs, as well as promotion to 0-4 boards. The analysis looks at 
17,134 URL officers and promotion-board results between fiscal years 1986 through 
2001. The analysis employs multivariate, nonlinear logit models for retention and 
promotion to measure the effectiveness of the commissioning sources. 
Table 9 exhibits retention rates for ROTC scholarship, ROTC-contract, 
and OCS graduates, as compared to USNA graduates. It shows that ROTC-scholarship 
and OCS graduates are significantly (at .05 level) less likely to stay in the Navy to O-4 
than USNA officers (9% and 17% less likely, respectively). As for the ROTC-contract 
graduates, the result statistically is not significant and there is not much retention 





Table 9. Summary of Retention Results for URL Officers (From: Mehay and 
Bernard, 2003) 
 
**=Significant at .05 level 
E. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER PROMOTIONS 
The Navy promotion system chooses the required number of desired, quality 
officers to implement its missions. In order to accomplish this goal, the Navy promotes 
an adequate number of officers as openings occur. An impartial and effective promotion 
system enables the Navy to sustain the strength in each grade and ensures retaining a 
highly qualified and motivated officer force by providing reasonably consistent and 
visible progression patterns for all competitive categories, to select the best-qualified 
officers. Promotions through lieutenant (O-3) are based on meeting minimum 
requirements and qualifications only, whereas promotion to lieutenant commander (O-4) 
and more senior pay grades relies on the judgment of promotion boards. 
1. Promotion 
Since there is no lateral entry opportunity, the Navy heavily depends on its 
promotion system to find qualified officers for its senior ranks. While SWOs are 
promoted through lieutenant (O-3) depending on their qualifications, minimum time in 
rank, and minimum time in service, they are selected by statutory boards for subsequent 
ranks based on their performance and background (Asch & Warner, 2001). According to 
Carman, (2008), officers’ worth increases as they are promoted for higher levels due to 
increased human capital and the importance of high-level assignments. Moreover, since 
high-ranking officers have a great impact on their subordinates’ performance and 
motivation, their competency creates a butterfly effect on troop achievement. This creates 
a synergy and increase in total productivity for the Navy, thus making high-quality 
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officers even more indispensable (Carman, 2008). Figure 23 is a graphical depiction of 
the inverse relationship between the officer inventory size and the value of officers to the 
Navy at each rank. 
 
Figure 23.   Inverse Relationship between Officer Inventory and the Value of Officers to the 
Navy (From: Carman, 2008) 
The Navy’s statutory officer-promotion boards assemble annually and select 
qualified officers for promotion to O-4 and higher levels, based on the quality of their 
service record. The “precept” is a document that is approved by the convening authority 
and directed to the president of the board (Rogers & Grose, 2003). This document 
provides general and specific guidance to the statutory board regarding the criteria upon 
which their selections should be based. The precept provides several important factors for 
the board to take into consideration, such as board membership, promotion percentages, 
and any specific guidance for the Navy’s special needs at that time. The statutory boards 
consider both the precept and other sources of information while selecting qualified 
officers for promotion. According to Rogers and Grose (2003), the other sources are: 
 personnel-record microfiche: contains an officer’s fitness reports 





 Officer Summary Record (OSR)/Performance Summary Record (PSR): an 
officer’s career résumé, containing a summary of his microfiche 
 any correspondence the officer submits to the board about his record  
The board does not take into account any information other than what is listed 
above. 
Asch and Warner (2001) suggest that individuals are evaluated on both ability and 
work effort during the promotion process. The statutory boards take into account both 
these characteristics, which are written in service records, while selecting officers for 
promotion. However, sometimes, unobserved factors may also affect promotion 
decisions. Promotion boards consider officers who are “fully qualified” and then select 
those who are “best qualified.” Fully-qualified officers are able to perform the duties of 
the next-higher pay grade, while best-qualified status is assigned to officers after being 
evaluated in the following four areas (Carman, 2008): 
 proven and sustained performance  
 education, personal, and professional development  
 ability to meet statutory promotion objectives  
 achievement of competency and skill requirements 
According to Carman (2008), there is a limited number of openings for senior-
ranking officers, due to the hierarchical structure of the Navy. Beginning with the rank of 
lieutenant commander (O-4), the Navy limits the number of officers to be promoted to 
the next rank. Based on this restriction, the promotion system acts as a contest, in which 
officers compete with their peers for a limited number of promotion slots (Carman, 
2008). Due to this rivalry, officers have to increase their work effort and reduce 
individual slacking. Since higher retention rates cause more officers to compete with each 
other during promotion cycles, this causality increases the quality of cohort at the next 
rank and makes the competition harder (Carman, 2008). 
In addition to voluntary separation, the Navy’s promotion system contains an “up-
or-out” clause (Asch & Warner, 2001). If officers (O-2 through O-4) cannot promote to 
the next rank after two annual promotion cycles, they can be processed for involuntary 
separation. In some occasions, even if they cannot promote to the next rank in two tries, 
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most lieutenant commanders (O-4) generally are allowed as active duty until retirement at 
twenty years of service. As for commanders (O-5) and captains (O-6), they have similar 
“up-or-out” requirements and mandatory retirement by twenty-eight and thirty years, 
respectively (Carman, 2008) 
2. Promotion Zones and Promotion Timing 
Carman (2008) suggests that eligibility for promotion is determined by the 
secretary of the Navy’s annual promotion plan, which sets up promotion zones for 
surface warfare officers. Promotion zones are the number of officers needed to fill 
projected personnel requirements and they are established for each grade and competitive 
category. Promotion zones categorize which officers are eligible for evaluation for 
promotion to a specific grade, based on lineal seniority. Zone size is a function of 
promotion opportunity. Promotion-zone opportunity is calculated as the numbers to be 
recommended for promotion divided by the number of officers in a promotion zone. 
Officers are categorized as “in zone,” “below zone,” and “above zone.” (Carman,  2008). 
Above-zone: Officers in this zone have been previously reviewed in the in-zone 
population, but were not selected for promotion by the board. 
In-zone: Officers in this zone include the primary population eligible for 
consideration by the selection board. 
Below-zone: Below-zone officers are junior to other officers in the promotion 
zone. If not selected, these officers do not acquire a failure of selection. This group is a 
rough estimate of the following year’s in-zone population. According to Carman (2008), 
Title 10, USC, limits the number of below-zone officers that can be selected to 10% of 
the “authorized to select number.” Officers who are “below zone” and “above zone” may 
be considered for promotion as approved by the secretary of the Navy (Carman, 2008). 
The promotion timing and promotion opportunities for promotion to lieutenant, junior 
grade (O-2) through captain (O-6) are exhibited in Figure 24. 
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Figure 24.   Flow Point (Promotion Timing) and Promotion Opportunities (From: Active 
Officer Promotion Brief) 
Promotion timing (promotion flow point) is the average years of commissioned 
service before eligibility for promotion to the next rank (Yardley et al., 2005). For 
instance, lieutenant (O-3) SWOs will be in zone for promotion to lieutenant commander 
(O-4) at approximately ten years, plus or minus a year, of commissioned service. 
According to Yardley et al. (2005), promotion opportunity refers to the percentage of all 
officers selected for promotion from above, in, and below the zone. The Figure 25 shows 
an example of promotion opportunity. If we assume that there are sixty officers from 
Above Zone (AZ) and forty officers from In Zone (IZ) and only twenty officers will 
promote to next rank, then officers have a 20% chance of promotion.  Planners develop 
annual promotion plans and use selection percentage guidelines, along with the number 
of vacancies, to determine the number of officers in the zone for selection.  
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Figure 25.   Illustration of Promotion Opportunity (From: “Active Officer Promotion Brief”) 
According to the “Active Officer Promotion Brief,” performance is the most 
important factor used by promotion boards in determining promotions. The precept 
outlines certain specific needs the Navy has from year to year, but the motto “best and 
fully qualified for the needs of the Navy” still applies. Board members have experience in 
the Navy and have faced the choices and decisions that officers have to make in their 
careers.  They know what the hard jobs are.   
Active Officer Promotion Brief suggests that while performance is still the 
number-one indicator, officers can certainly enhance their competitiveness by getting 
additional qualities and subspecialties and pursuing advanced degrees. Doing the right 
thing at the right time is crucial. For example, a tour at postgraduate (PG) school may be 
good for one’s career, but if one’s contemporaries are conquering career milestones like 
becoming a department head or XO, it may be best to do a PG school tour at a more 
strategic time (Active Officer Promotion Brief). 
Another thing to consider is that it is important to screen for DH, XO, and CO to 
have the best opportunity for promotion; so administrative screening boards held by the 
community analyze officer records in many ways to determine who gets to take the most 
competitive jobs. Always taking and excelling in the recognized hard jobs is the best way 
to ensure competitiveness for promotion (Active Officer Promotion Brief). 
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For example, the O-4 promotion board selects approximately 80% of the qualified 
officers for promotion with a variation of plus or minus 10%, depending on the officer 
community. Since the SWO inventory gap at the midgrade and senior levels is larger than 
the others, SWO promotion rates are much higher than the rates established by the DoD. 
Table 10 exhibits SWO promotion rates (for both conventional and nuclear-qualified 
SWOs) to lieutenant commander (O-4) for FY 2003 through FY 2008. Table 11 shows 
similar SWO promotion rates to commander (O-5), and Table 12 shows comparable 
SWO promotion rates to captain (O-6). In tables 10, 11, and 12, for each promotion 
category (i.e., “above zone,” “in zone,” and “below zone”), the data are displayed as the 
number of SWOs eligible for promotion, the number of SWOs selected for promotion, 
and the overall percentage of SWOs selected for promotion (Carman, 2008). 
Table 10. SWO Promotion Rates to Lieutenant Commander (O-4) for FY 2003 
through FY 2008 (From: Carman, 2008) 
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Table 11. SWO Promotion Rates to Commander (O-5) for FY 2003 through FY 
2008 (From: Carman, 2008) 
 
Table 12. SWO Promotion Rates to Captain (O-6) for FY 2003 through FY 2008 
(From: Carman, 2008) 
 
 
Table 10 indicates that the past six lieutenant-commander (O-4) board promotion 
rates for SWOs were above the DoD standard of 80% promotion probability  (found in 
Figure 24). Similarly, as illustrated in Table 11, in five of the past six fiscal years, 
commander (O-5) SWO board selection rates were above the DoD-standard 70% O-5 
promotion opportunity. As shown in Table 12, results varied for captain (O-6) promotion 
board statistics. While some fiscal-year boards selected above the DoD standard 50% O-6 
promotion opportunity, in other years the rate fell below the standard promotion rate 
(Carman, 2008).  
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According to a CNA (2008), the rates of screening for command and promotion to 
flag officer in the SWO community vary by commissioning source. The SWO 
community has the most distinct pattern of percentages of screening for command. Table 
13 shows that USNA and NROTC graduates have similar probabilities of first screening 
for command, 27.2% and 24.4% respectively, while OCS graduates have a lower 
probability (%12.1). USNA accessions who stay to YCS 15–16 are more than twice as 
likely to screen for command as their OCS counterparts, and slightly more likely than 
their NROTC counterparts. Overall, for the combined URL communities, USNA appears 
to have the highest percentage of accessions screening for command among those who 
stay to that career milestone, although the rate for NROTC accessions is similar. In 
contrast, the rate for OCS accessions is noticeably lower (CNA, 2008). 
Table 13. SWO Screen for Command by Accession Source (From CNA,2008) 
 
Table 14 exhibits that, in the SWO community, NROTC accessions have an 
average rate of promotion to flag rank that is roughly twice that of their OCS counterparts 
(2.1% versus 1.5%, respectively), and the NROTC accessions have an average rate that is 
midway between the USNA rate (2.7%) and the OCS rate. USNA graduates have the 
highest promotion rate to flag officer among the other sources (CNA, 2008). 
Table 14. SWO Promotion to Flag Officer (From CNA, 2008). 
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As the previous tables show, USNA accessions usually have higher rates of 
screening for command and for promoting to flag rank than accessions from other 
sources, particularly those from OCS. This result suggests that, if a relatively small 
number of additional accessions were needed on an ongoing basis (e.g., not a temporary 
increase in accessions), there might be an advantage in increasing the number of USNA 
accessions, assuming they perform similarly to, past USNA accessions. 
3. Promotion-Board Process 
According to the Active Officer Promotion Brief, there are two types of boards: 
statutory and administrative. Statutory boards contain promotion (including special and 
spot promotion boards), selective early-retirement boards (SERB), and various 
continuation boards.  All other boards are administrative. A statutory URL board consists 
of the following officers (Active Officer Promotion Brief): 
 five aviators (at least one 1320) 
 three surface  
 one special warfare (1130)  
 one special operations (1140) 
 three submarine 
 one joint representative 
 one acquisition professional 
 minority/female reps 
 one USNR  
The mission of any board is to select those officers that are best qualified, based 
on performance. Additional guidance in the precept addresses specific guidance for the 
board to consider in selecting the best-qualified officers. According to Rogers and Grose 
(2003), the process can be broken down into three sections:  
a. pre-board 
b. record review 
c.  selection 
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a. The Pre-Board Phase 
All preparations begin four months before the board meeting date and are 
done in this phase. The list of eligible officers is frequently checked with an official 
automated database to avoid any problems. Researching and correcting those problems 
and inconsistencies is carried out in the “prep week” or “board-recorder week” (Rogers & 
Grose, 2003). 
b. The Records Review Phase 
The voting members of the board share all the eligible officers’ records 
among them for review. Board members use an information system called the Electronic 
Military Personnel Records System (EMPRS) to review a candidate’s record. In a 
nutshell, the board members evaluate all pertinent data on their assigned candidates via 
an EMPRS terminal (Rogers & Grose, 2003).  
c. The Selection Phase 
Having completed the records-review phase, the board passes to the next 
step: the selection phase. In this phase, the board members assemble in a room called “the 
tank” which is a private, theater-like room where all the members discuss and vote on 
candidates. Several tank sessions are usually required before the board selects the final 
candidates they believe best qualified for promotion. Finally, the board completes its 
considerations and votes to approve the tentative selections. (Rogers and Grose, 2003) 
4. Promotion as a Measure of Performance 
Since promotion to a higher rank assumes increased responsibility and 
qualification for higher-level job assignments, the SWO promotion system basically aims 
to promote the most qualified officers to ensure a good person–job fit. In this system, 
promotion plays two important roles. On the one hand, it tries to ensure a good person–
job fit based on ability; on the other hand, it makes officers increase their performance to 
be promoted (Fairburn and Malcomson, 2001). Theoretically, officers who do not have 
the required qualifications for the next rank cannot be selected for promotion. However, 
since promotion opportunities at midgrade promotion boards are significantly higher, 
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with a promotion opportunity of up to 90%, and the eligible pool for promotion is larger 
than other boards, there is a possibility that some officers who are not ready to accept the 
responsibility of higher rank may be selected nevertheless (Yardley et al., 2005). 
According to Carman (2008), the surface warfare community is more exposed to this 
scenario, because the SWO inventory gap is larger than that of other communities at the 
midgrade and senior ranks. For example, suppose that an annual O-4 board considered a 
hundred SWOs for promotion and only seventy-five of them have the qualifications 
required to successfully perform the duties of a lieutenant commander (O-4). Because of 
the inventory gap in the SWO community at the O-4 level, the board precept offered 
selecting 90% of eligible officers. Most probably, although the fitness to perform the 
increased responsibility associated with the promotion is questionable in the case of 
fifteen officers, the promotion board would take into account the precept guidance and 
select ninety SWOs for promotion. This can be troublesome for the SWO community, as 
more highly qualified SWOs leave the Navy at earlier ports of exit. Therefore, in order to 
meet personnel requirements, lower-quality officers may promote. However, since the 
promotion opportunity significantly decreases as the rank becomes more senior, the 
possibility of this phenomenon decreases in higher promotion boards (Carman, 2008). 
Carman (2008) states that although SWO performance is not monetarily 
rewarded, their performance is evaluated and rewarded during promotion boards. When 
they promote to a higher rank, they get higher pay and receive an increase in allowance. 
Promotion boards take into account advanced education, training, professional surface 
warfare qualifications, the challenge and visibility of past job assignments, Joint 
Professional Military Education (JPME), joint experience, and personal awards as a 
measure of performance. Both past performance and potential ability to perform future 
assignments at a higher pay grade are considered. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
promotions may be a good proxy for performance among SWOs (Carman, 2008). 
When the NPRST retention poll was carried out, some questions about the 
promotion system were asked to garner opinions as to the advancement/promotion 
system in the Navy. The question below was asked and results are exhibited in Figures 26
and 27.
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Figure 26 displays that while 86% of officers have a clear understanding of the 
promotion system, only 56% are satisfied with it. 42% believe that the most qualified and 
deserving sailors receive promotion. 
Q17. How much do you AGREE or DISAGREE with the following statements 
regarding advancement/promotions? 
 
Figure 26.   Advancement/Promotion (From: NPRST Retention “Quick Poll”) 
Figure 27 exhibits that while 57% of senior officers are satisfied with the 
promotion system, this figure falls to 55% for junior officers. 
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Figure 27.   Satisfied With Navy Advancement/Promotion System by Years of Service (From: 
NPRST Retention “Quick Poll”) 
F. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
1. Study by Ergun (March, 2003) 
a. Model and descriptive statistics 
Ergun (2003) argues that the main difference between accession sources is 
the time that graduates are exposed to military culture and training. USNA graduates 
receive the longest exposure, followed by Naval Reserve Officer Training Course and 
Officer Candidate Course graduates.  
Ergun uses data from the Marine Corps Commissioned Officer Accession 
Career (MCCOC) data file and merges it with fitness-report files. The data includes 
28,058 observations from cohorts FY 1980 through FY 1999. He examines the effect of 
seven accession programs on five different performance measures, which include 
performance at the Basic School (TBS); retention to ten years of service; promotion to O-
4 and O-5; and a performance index based on officer-fitness reports. 
In “TBS performance model,” he examines four performance measures as 
dependent variables. These measures are overall class-standing percentiles; academic 
class-standing percentiles; military class-standing percentiles; and leadership class-
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standing percentiles. Overall class standing includes academic, military, and leadership 
standings. He utilizes a percentile method to control for cohort size differences. 
In the ten years of commissioned service model, the dependent variable is 
a dichotomous variable which shows whether a service member survived in service until 
ten years. The promotion to O-4 and O-5 model utilizes a two-stage probit regression 
technique. In the first stage, Ergun examines whether the service member survived until 
his respective (O4 or O5) promotion board, and in the second stage, whether he got 
promoted. In the performance-index model, he examines FITREPs of service members. 
Since there is more than one FITREP for each grade, he computes average scores and 
converts them to a one-hundred scale for all grades. 
For all models, Ergun groups independent variables in three ways: 
personal characteristics, cognitive human capital, and affective skills. He also uses TBS 
performance as an independent variable for the other performance models. Personal 
characteristics consist of sex, race, and marital status. Cognitive human capital consists of 
General Classification Test (GCT) scores and TBS performance, while affective traits 
consist of occupational specialty, prior enlisted service, commissioning source, duty type 
being reported in FITREPs, and qualification for promotion. He also includes fiscal year 
dummies as proxies to control for other effects.  
In the TBS performance models, Ergun finds that graduates of three 
enlisted commissioning programs—the Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Program 
(MECEP), Meritorious Commissioning Program (MCP), and the Enlisted 
Commissioning Program (ECP)—have the highest percentile scores at TBS. NROTC and 
USNA constitute the middle group while OCC and platoon-leader course (PLC) members 
receive the lowest scores.  
In the retention to 10 YCS model, he finds that the commissioning source 
is a significant predictor of retention. For all cohorts, the mean retention rate is 55%. 
However 86% of MECEP graduates and 73% of ECP graduates survive to ten years. 
USNA, NROTC, and PLC follow these with retention rates between 54% and 56%. OCC 
graduates have the lowest retention rate at 50%. 
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In the promotion to O-4 model, Ergun finds  that the overall promotion 
rate is 0.735. Unlike previous models, this model shows just small differences between 
commissioning sources, varying between 0.711 and 0.771; but they are significant. 
Overall mean promotion to O-5 is 0.676, but there are significant 
differences between commissioning programs. USNA and NROTC have the highest 
promotion rates at 0.75 and 0.72, respectively, about five points higher than PLC. 
The performance index results (based on FITREPs) show that MECEP and 
MCP graduates are top performers for grades O-1 through O-3, and USNA and NROTC 
graduates have the best performance FITREPs results for O-4. Although this is the case 
for all cohorts, the study implies that there is an inflation of fitness-report scores before 
1999, the year when the Marine Corps introduced the new performance index. Although 
limited by data size, t-tests show that there was no significant difference between PI 
grades between 1999 and 2000, after the introduction of the new reporting system. 
b. Results 
After finding statistically significant differences among commissioning 
sources in descriptive statistics, Ergun estimates various multivariate models. Among 
other performance measures, we focus especially on promotion and retention results. 
Taking USNA graduates as the baseline category, the study finds that 
officers from MECEP have 15 percentage points higher retention rates. Adding another 
6.7 points for having prior enlisted service brings the MECEP retention rate to .86. OCC 
and PLC graduates have 10.5 and 3.9 percentage point lower retention rates, respectively, 
compared to USNA graduates. Marriage and age at commissioning are two significant 
variables that increase retention by 7.7-percentage and 1.95 percentage points, 
respectively. 
Looking at promotion to O-4, Ergun utilizes a two-stage probit model. 
Being a MECEP graduate turns out to be insignificant, while other sources positively 
increase promotion compared to USNA. Having prior enlisted-service experience is also 
insignificant. He also finds that being married or female positively affects promotion. 
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Thanks to the two-stage bivariate model, he discovers that those who couldn’t survive 
until O-4 promotion board most probably wouldn’t have promoted anyway. 
Lastly, in the promotion to O-5 model, among commissioning sources, 
only MECEP and ECP are significant in having 21.1 and 25 percentage point positive 
effects, respectively.  But taking prior enlisted service into account, which has a -27.5 
percentage-point negative promotion difference, MECEP’s positive effect decreases 
dramatically. NROTC and PLC members also have higher promotion rates than USNA 
graduates. One last significant variable is TBS class rank, which increases promotion. 
Table 15 presents overall logit regression results and shows only those variables in focus 
for our study. 
Table 15. Overall results for retention and promotion (From Ergun, 2003) 






USNA (Base case)    
NROTC N.S 7.5*** 9.4*** 
PLC -3.9** 10.0*** 6.3*** 
OCC -10.5** 13.9*** N.S 
MECEP 15.0*** N.S 21.1*** 
ECP N.S 9.1*** 25.0*** 
Prior Enlisted 6.7*** N.S -27.5*** 
** Significant at the 0.05 level; *** Significance at the 0.01 level; Perc.Points: 
Percentage Points: N.S.: Not Significant  
 
Ergun does not include an age variable in his study, which is a common 
variable in previous studies. The reason for this exclusion is because age is highly 
correlated with the prior-enlisted variable. Service members with prior enlisted 
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experience are three- to four years older than other (especially USNA) graduates. This is 
also true for our data, in which USNA graduates demonstrate the most condensed age 
distribution, averaging about 22. 
2. Study by Bernard (2002) 
Bernard (2002) analyzes the effect of commissioning sources on promotion and 
retention for U.S. Navy officers. He also utilizes lifecycle-cost techniques to find out 
which commissioning source is more cost effective, assuming a steady-state force 
structure. He examines whether an officer survives until O-4 promotion board and then if 
he is promoted. 
Bernard states that lateral transfer into the SWO community negatively effects O-
4 promotions. That is credited to the absence of ship experience, which is vital for the 
SWO career path. The data does not allow further investigation because there is no date 
information on when the lateral transfers occurred. If it does not occur too late to affect a 
particular career, there might be a chance to acquire experience for officers who transfer 
into the SWO community. 
Bernard also argues that most prior studies use survival rates alone as a 
performance measure. This is a weakness, because there are innumerable reasons for an 
officer to leave the Navy, and without understating these underlying reasons, it is difficult 
to adopt performance measures. Officers who leave before the O-4 promotion board may 
leave either voluntarily or involuntarily. One of the biggest reasons for involuntary 
separations was the Navy personnel drawdown policy in the early 1990s. The results 
would be biased if the reason of separation for these officers were not dealt with 
explicitly. 
Bernard uses data from the Navy Officer Data Card. The data includes restricted 
and unrestricted line officers from years through 1983 through 1990, which is merged 
with data from promotion board results from the years 1986 through 2001. Observations 
with missing information are dropped and the sample is limited to those between twenty 
and thirty years of age. Although dropping observations with missing values may cause 
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bias in the results, Bernard deletes 2,934 observations (15% of total sample) due to their 
omission of academic background. That leaves 17,134 URL and 5,129 restricted line 
observations. 
Referencing Bowman (1995) Bernard suspects that examining commissioning 
sources as a whole may cause an aggregation bias. This bias implies that not examining 
each community separately may hide a community’s particular effect by aggregating it 
with other communities. He thus divides data into three URL communities (surface, 
submarine, and aviation) and one restricted-line group. 
 
a. Model 
Bernard chooses dependent variables based on whether an officer survived 
to the O-4 promotion board for the retention model and whether he was promoted to O-4 
for the promotion model. Independent variables consist of demographics, human capital, 
college selectivity, community designator, and control variables for years. 
The sources of commission are USNA, ROTC-scholarship, ROTC-
contract, OCS, and ECP. Three “college selectivity” variables control the academic 
background of the officers. He uses Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges publication 
to classify undergraduate educations into three tiers: most selective, moderately selective, 
and least selective. The study also includes variables for lateral transfers, which was not 
analyzed in previous studies. He hypothesizes that being transferred into another 
community may indicate dissatisfaction with the initial community, which should have a 
positive effect on performance. 
b. Results 
The retention model consists of two results. The basic model finds that 
ROTC-scholarship and OCS graduates are less likely to stay up to O-4 board than USNA 
graduates. On the other hand, ROTC-contract and ECP graduates have the same retention 
rates of USNA graduates. Having technical degrees, prior enlisted service, or being male 
are other variables that positively affect retention. There is no significant difference 
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between black and white officers, but other races are less likely to stay than whites. Also, 
officers that are married or single with children are more likely to stay than those who are 
single without children. 
The second retention model is similar to the first, except that it includes 
variables for warfare communities and college selectivity, hoping to control for college 
quality among accession sources. Bernard finds that non-selective ROTC-scholarship and 
ROTC-contract graduates are more likely to stay than USNA officers, while non-
selective OCS graduates are less likely to stay. Looking at net retention rates for each 
accession source after grouping same-quality colleges, ROTC-scholarship and OCS 
graduates have a lower probability of staying by 15.6% and 9.4% respectively. The other 
effect of controlling for college selectivity makes the ”black” variable significant and 
shows that black officers are 9.6% more likely to stay. 
The promotion model implements the same logit model techniques as the 
retention model. Bernard finds that ROTC-scholarship graduates are 8.1% less likely to 
promote than USNA graduates. 
The promotion model for the SWO community reveals that ROTC 
scholarship and OCS graduates are less likely to be promoted than USNA graduates. 
Having a technical major increases the promotion probability by 3.3%. Having prior 
service and being black are not significant in the model, whereas other race officers are 
8.6% less likely to promote to O-4. Also, surprisingly, neither sex nor marital status is 
significant. After rerunning the same model and adding the college selectivity variable, 
he finds that ROTC-scholarship and OCS graduates from highly selective colleges have a 
higher probability of promotion than USNA graduates. 
3. Study by Bowman and Mehay (1999) 
a. Model 
Bowman and Mehay (1999) examine the effects of graduate education on 
the job performance of Navy officers, using promotion to O-4 as a performance measure. 
They obtained data from the Navy’s Promotion History File, which covers officers that 
were reviewed by promotion boards between 1985 and 1990. This file was merged with 
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fitness-report information on the officers in question. Bowman and Mehay separated the 
subjects into line and staff officers, due to their different community structures and 
evaluation characteristics. 
The model they use separates human capital into two components: 
cognition and affective skills. Affective skills consist of, but are not limited to, 
perseverance, self-discipline, leadership, initiative, and ability to cooperate. Since these 
are mostly work-related attitudes, the researchers believe that commissioning sources are 
good instrumental variables for them. They also include variables for cognitive abilities 
like college grade-point average and whether the officer has a technical major or not. 
b. Results 
Descriptive statistics show that the promotion rates for officers with a 
master’s degree and without are 0.41 and 0.37, respectively (for USNA graduates). 
Promotion rates for master’s degree/no degree are 0.27/0.30 for ROTC, 0.25/0.26 for 
OCS and 0.07/0.07 for NESEP. Having a master’s degree in USNA is relatively more 
helpful than it is for other commissioning sources. This small difference is attributed to 
the academic background of officers that made them eligible for higher education. 
In all models, they conclude that USNA graduates are more likely to 
promote than other commissioning sources. This is attributed to their greater human 
capital, which is in more in line with Navy requirements. Other factors that positively 
contribute to promotion rates are being younger, female, and married. 
4. Study by Parcell et al. (2003) 
This study was conducted to determine factors that affect Navy officers’ careers 
that can be observed at the commissioning date. They investigate whether commissioning 




The performance measures used are promotion to O-3, O-4, O-5, and O-6. 
Regression analysis techniques are implemented to examine cohorts commissioned from 
FY 1976 through FY 1996. They examined the three largest communities separately: 
aviation, surface warfare, and submarine. 
Table 16 shows average promotion rates for SWOs. USNA graduates have 
higher promotion rates than other sources. One thing to note, though, is that the figures in 
the table are calculated based on promotion-board results. The rates do not account for 
officers who left between any two promotion points, which yields a biased picture of true 
promotion rates. 
Table 16. SWO promotion rates (From Parcell, 2003) 
 
 
The study uses Peterson’s Guide to determine college selectivity and 
creates variables for historically black college or universities and Hispanic-serving 
institutions. They also included demographic variables and year dummies.  
b. Results 
The study finds that commissioning sources affect promotion in the early 
stages of an officer’s career. OCS graduates had the lowest promotion rates to O-3. 
USNA, on the other hand, is the most successful, despite its higher cost. Parcell et al., 
also highlight that higher undergraduate grades are associated with higher promotion 
rates. The result does not mean that higher grades have a causal effect on performance. 
Rather, it may be that other attributes, e.g. ability, time-management skills, organizational 
skills, and attention to detail, are correlated with both success in school and work. One 
interesting finding was that black officers who attended historically black college or 
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universities were less likely to be promoted in the surface warfare community, holding 
other factors fixed. This was not the case for the other communities. 
The promotion to O-4 model found that USNA, NROTC, OCS and 
enlisted-to-officer programs have almost the same effect on promotion rates, given that 
officers survived to eleven years of service. On the other hand, college grades were a 
more important predictor than in the O-3 model. Above-average grade points increased 
the probability of promotion by 4%, whereas below-average grades decreased the 
probability by 5%. Other factors contributing to promotion positively were being female 
and married. 
5. Summary 
Many studies have found that commissioning source has a substantial effect on 
retention and promotion. Since every study uses a different methodology and selected 
sample, their results differ. These differences could also be due to the fact that over time, 
Navy personnel policies have changed. This study will add to this literature findings from 
more recent cohorts. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Throughout history, officers have been the backbone and a key component of the 
armed forces for all nations. The overall quality of a nation’s military is highly dependent 
to the quality of its officers. Every military wants to recruit and retain the best individuals 
for its officer corps. Attracting and keeping high-quality personnel has been a challenge 
for the armed forces. The U.S. Navy spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually to 
educate and train candidates for commissioning as officers. The United States Naval 
Academy, the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps, Officer Candidate School, and 
enlisted-to-officer commissioning programs are major commissioning sources of surface 
warfare officers (Korkmaz, 2005). 
Retention is defined as the voluntary decision of officers to stay in the military 
after their MSR. The services set annual goals for retention to meet the required number 
of officers to carry out their missions. Since manning shortages can cause great troubles 
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within the military personnel system, military services watchfully track officer retention. 
On one hand, if too few officers are retained, the military would face problems from a 
lack of experienced leaders and decreased efficiency; on the other hand, the retention of 
too many officers would decrease promotion opportunities and cause many officers to 
leave involuntary. Unlike nearly all other organizations, the DoD relies completely on its 
own manpower, and higher-ranking members must be retained and promoted from lower 
ranks, as the military services have a closed personnel system. While most other 
organizations can and do hire from the outside at all levels, the DoD has to obtain 
required personnel from its own closed system by accession and promotion through all 
levels. Therefore, if the military services fail to meet recruiting or retention goals at lower 
levels in a given year, they will have significant problems in producing experienced 
leaders for subsequent years (GAO-Military Compensation, 2010). There are many 
factors affecting retention such as human-capital investments, compensation and the 
external economy, demographic and job-related factors, and commissioning sources. 
The literature shows that an increase in compensation has a positive effect on 
retention among surface warfare officers. Additionally, investments in human capital 
significantly influence officers’ decisions at the ports of exit. Demographic factors such 
as age, marital status, race, gender, dependent status, and educational background also 
affect stay-or-leave decisions. Studies show that deployment adversely affects retention 
and that there is strong correlation between high job satisfaction and retention. Job 
satisfaction strongly depends on job performance and leadership. Since job satisfaction, 
job performance, and leadership strongly relate to retention, they must not be ignored in 
any analysis of SWO retention. 
The function of the naval promotion system is to choose the required number of 
desired quality officers to implement its missions. In order to accomplish this goal, the 
Navy promotes an adequate number of officers as openings occur. An impartial and 
effective promotion system enables the Navy to sustain the strength in each grade and 




consistent and visible progression patterns for all competitive categories. Promotions 
through lieutenant (O-3) are based solely on meeting minimum requirements and 
qualifications, whereas promotion to lieutenant commander (O-4) and more senior pay 
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III. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
A. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data for this analysis is obtained from the Officer Master File (OMF) via the 
Navy Econometric Modeling (NEM) online data system. It contains 10,295 observations. 
All observations include surface warfare officers between fiscal years 1994 through 2009. 
Observations after fiscal year 2004 were dropped from data because these officers were 
still to reach the O-4 career point at the time this study was conducted. Variables that are 
used in the model are explained in detail in the following section. 
B. VARIABLES 
1. Performance Measures 
Performance measures are dichotomous dependent variables that indicate whether 
an individual achieved a particular goal or not. For the retention model, this dependent 
variable is “Stay.” It takes a value of 1 if the individual survives up to the O-4 promotion 
board and 0 if he left the Navy before that point. For the promotion model, the dependent 
variable is “promote.” It takes a value of 1 if the individual promotes to O-4 and 0 
otherwise. 
Table 17 depicts retention and promotion rates by commissioning sources. Note 
that these numbers are derived only from officers who were promoted to O-3. Officers 
who left before the O-3 promotion point are omitted from the rest of the analysis. The 
first column in the “Retention” panel shows the number of officers who promoted to O-3. 
The second column represents the proportion of officers who stayed in service until the 
O-4 promotion board. Similarly, in the “Promotion” panel, the first column indicates the 
number of officers who stayed until the O-4 promotion board. The second column 
indicates the proportion of officers who received promotion to O-4. The retention 
numbers are highest for NROTC-regular and USNA (N in promotion), followed by OCS. 
However, promotion rates (the mean for promotion) are highest for OCS and NROTC-
contracts, followed by other sources. The total number shows that out of 7,262 officers 
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promoted to O-3, 3,236 stayed in service until the O-4 promotion board. In addition, the 
promotion rate to O-4 for these “stayers” is 58.59%. 




  N Mean SD N Mean SD 
USNA 2,630 0.523 0.5 966 0.535 0.499 
NROTC Regular 2,297 0.605 0.489 1,007 0.49 0.5 
NROTC 
Contract 256 0.641 0.481 118 0.754 0.432 
OCS 1,230 0.745 0.436 665 0.786 0.41 
Other 849 0.677 0.468 480 0.571 0.495 
TOTAL 7,262 0.6087 0.488 3236 0.5859 0.4926 
 
2. Commissioning Sources 
Commissioning sources are broken down into the following categories: “USNA,” 
“NROTC-regular,” “NROTC-contract,” “OCS,” and “other sources.” USNA, NROTC-
regular, and NROTC-contract represent the graduates from their respective sources. 
OCSs consist of graduates from Officer Candidate School and Naval Officer Candidate. 
Other sources are few in graduate numbers, and they are grouped in the “other sources” 
variable. These sources include, but not limited to, the USN Integration Program, 
commissioning directly from the Air Force Academy, and from USA commissioned 
status. Figure 28 shows the distribution of graduates from each commissioning source 
over fiscal years. It is expected that USNA and NROTC-regular graduates are more likely 
to survive in service up to the O-4 promotion board. But this affiliation has less effect on 
promotion to O-4. 
As shown in Figure 28, there is a relative increase in the number of OCS 
graduates between the years 2001 and 2004. That can be an effect of policy change by the 
Navy in an effort to respond quickly to “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) needs. In 
addition, graduates from “other sources” were in large numbers during 1997 and 1999 for 
this ten-year term. 
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Figure 28.   Commissioning Source Distribution Over Fiscal Years 
3. Marital Status 
Officers are divided into four groups according to their marital status: single 
without children, single with children, married without children, and married with 
children. We are expecting that married officers will be better performers. Prior studies 
have found evidence of a “marriage premium” (Bowman and Mehay, 1999). Also, 
officers with children are expected to perform better, as they are probably more risk 
averse and feel more devoted to their families. This precludes them from quitting the 
service and venturing to new jobs. 
As shown in the Figure 29, the rates of personnel that have children, either single 
or married, are relatively stable over the years. There is an increase in the rate of childless 
singles between 2000 and 2003. The reverse effect is true for married officers without 
children in the same period. 
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Figure 29.   Marital Status Distribution Over Fiscal Years 
4. Race 
Four different categories for race are included in the model: white, black, Asian, 
and other races. Racial distribution is shown in Figure 30 over time and appears relatively 
stable among the races. Based on prior studies, we expect to find that nonwhite officers 
will have a lower probability than whites in retention to O-4, but promotion rates will be 
higher if they survived. 
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Figure 30.   Race Distribution Over Fiscal Years 
5. Gender 
Gender is another variable that may affect retention and promotion. Based on 
previous studies, it is expected that females are less likely to stay until O-4, but those who 
do, will be more likely to promote. Figure 31 exhibits the male–female ratio over fiscal 
years. There is a conspicuous increase in the ratio of women after 1998. The average of 
female officers is 5% before 2000, but it increases to 20% on average after that. 
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Figure 31.   Gender Distribution Over Fiscal Years 
6. Educational Level 
Educational level is a good proxy for ability and other unobservable 
characteristics, such as motivation. The educational level of officers varies from less than 
two years of college to a master’s degree. Individuals with missing educational-level 
information are also included in the model to mitigate any sample-selection bias, because 
we suspect that they may be systematically different from other officers. The Figure 32 
shows educational-level distribution over time. There is an increase in the number of 
officers who either do not report their educational level or whose data is missing in the 
repository. The year 2005 is the year with the most missing data, with slightly over 40%. 
The number of officers who continue to higher education has been increasing since 2005. 
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Figure 32.   Education Level Distribution Over Fiscal Years 
7. University Major 
This variable represents officers’ majors at a university or college. They are 
classified into five groups: life/health/medical sciences, physical sciences, engineering 
sciences, humanitarian sciences, and management/economics. Figure 33 shows the 
distribution of majors over commissioning sources. Among reported cases, there are 
3,998 officers with technical majors and 4,729 non-technical. Between the years 1994 to 
2009, human science and engineering majors were the most popular majors, with 2,915 
and 2,655 officers respectively. Physical science and management/economics follow, 
with 1,304 and 1,050 officers, respectively. 
It is assumed that while university majors have an effect on retention, they are 
exogenous to promotion. Majors are used in retention models, but not in the promotion 
models estimated below.  
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Figure 33.   University Majors Distribution Over Fiscal Years 
8. Prior Enlisted Service  
It is assumed that having prior enlisted-service experience will contribute to both 
retention and promotion. These officers are better matches with military life, as indicated 
by their longer career in the military. In addition, this variable is highly correlated with 
age at commissioning. Thus, it is expected that its coefficient will be partly capturing the 
effect of age on retention and promotion. The older the officer, the more risk averse he is, 
in terms of job and profession change. That is why officers with prior enlisted service 
may be more likely to stay in the Navy. 
OCS graduates are the largest number of officers with prior enlisted service, with 
544 officers through 1994 to 2009. USNA, other sources, and NROTC-regular graduates 
follow it by 544, 225 and 164, respectively. There are only two officers with enlisted 
experience in the NROTC-contract. 
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9. Year Dummies 
Year dummies are created out of “fiscal_year” variable in the original data. These 
dummies represent cohorts of officers that start to serve in the same year. This is the idea 
that Bowman and Mehay (1999) implemented. Dummies serve two goals. First, they 
control for cohort specifications that distinguish them from others, e.g. cohort size, 
current recruiting policy, etc. Secondly, they control for unobservable variables that 
cannot be fully controlled. Those unobservable variables may be economic conditions, 
job-market trends, unemployment figures, and short-term policy changes. The models 
will include dummies for years from 1994 to 2004. 
10. Lateral Transfers 
In the data set, there are some officers who transferred laterally to other 
communities. The data does not have a variable showing whether they got promoted after 
the lateral transfer or whether they left the Navy. Nor is there any information as to why 
they left the SWO community. Due to that lack of information, lateral transfers are not 
included in our models. Some key factors may be revealed if further investigations are 
implemented in future studies beyond this study’s scope. To enable a basic analysis here, 
descriptive statistics of the entire data sample and officers who laterally transferred are 
exhibited in Table 18. There are also t-test results for differences between the two groups. 
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7 0.328 0.469   
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7 0.112 0.315   
83
8 0.0776 0.268 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The study uses multivariate-regression models for analysis of retention and 
promotion. Regression analysis is applied to estimate the impact of the explanatory 
variables on the dependent variable as they change (holding all the other variables 
constant). Two regression models are specified to find whether there is any relationship 
between commissioning source and job performance using retention and promotion as 
performance measures. In order to isolate the effect of commissioning source on retention 
or promotion, the study controls for other independent variables that represent personal 
demographics and professional background, in addition to the commissioning source 
variables. 
The first retention model analyzes the effect of the commissioning source on 
retention decisions at the end of the minimum service requirement. The data includes 
variables for those who left after getting promotion to O-3. It also includes data on 
officers who appeared before the O-4 promotion board. “Leavers” were defined as those 
who promote to O-3 but did not appear at the O-4 promotion board. This is also used to 
code the “Stay” variable, which is the performance variable for retention models. The 
“Promote” variable takes value of one for those who promoted to O-4. Data includes 
officers who started the commissioning service between the years 1994 to 2004. Officers 
who graduated after 2004 were still to reach the O-4 promotion point at the time data 
were extracted. STATA software is used to estimate the models. 
1. Theoretical Model 
Since the purpose of the research is to estimate the probability of retention or 
promotion, probit models (PM) can be used. Probit models are designed for binary-
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dependent variables that are bounded between zero and one. In this analysis, the binary-
dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the person leaves; otherwise it takes the value 
of 0. The theoretical model is (Wooldridge, 2009, pp. 575–586): 
ln (ŷ) = b0+b1X1+b2X2 +...+biXi + ei 
y ̂ = predicted odds ratio = (Probability of event / 1- Probability of event) 
ln (y ̂) = natural logarithm of the predicted odds ratio 
X1, X2,...,Xi = explanatory variables  
b0, b1, b2,...,bi = estimated coefficients of the independent variables 
ei = error term. 
Since the PM is nonlinear, the OLS estimation techniques cannot be applied. 
Therefore, the probit model utilizes maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) to estimate 
the coefficients instead of OLS. Only the sign of the effect can be understood by the 
coefficients. While a positive coefficient leads to an increase, a negative coefficient 
causes decrease in the probability of the outcome. However, partial effects of changes in 
the independent variables on the probability of the outcome can be measured using the 
dprobit command in STATA.  
Self-selection bias can be a concern in models of promotion to O-4 or higher. 
Since the officers who leave before reaching a promotion board are not a random sample 
of the original cohort, self-selection bias can be seen in the predictions. In another words, 
if the promotion probabilities of those who leave (had they stayed) are more than or less 
than those of officers who stay, then the promotion model suffers from self-selection 
bias. In order to overcome such a problem, we use Heckman’s self-selection model. This 
model involves a two-step procedure in which the first step includes predicting the 
determinants of survival. The second step incorporates this prediction and adjusts the 
estimates to take into account the nonrandom selection of the regression sample. In the 
study, probit and Heckman’s correction models are utilized to predict the effects of 
explanatory variables on retention and promotion. 
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2. Models 
The probit model is utilized to predict the retention model, since expected 
outcome is dichotomous. The retention model uses the “Stay” variable as a dependent 
variable. Independent variables include those representing commissioning sources, 
gender, race, marital status, educational background, and prior enlisted service. Also, 
year dummies are included in the model to control for other unobservable characteristics 
of cohorts and socio-economical conditions. 
ln (stay) = β0 + β1nrotc_r + β2nrotc_c + β3ocs + β4other_src + β5prior_enlisted 
+ β6female + black + β8asian + β9other_race + 
β10single_with_child+β11married_no_child + β12married_with_child + 
β13post_grad + β14life_medic_sci + β15phy_sci + β16hum_sci + β17mgt_econ + 
β17fiscal_years + ε 
The promotion model initially utilizes probit regression to predict the probability 
of promotion to O-4. The dependent variable is “Promote” which is a binary variable. 
Independent variables are the same as for the retention models, with the exception of   
variables that represents university majors of officers. We assume that these variables are 
exogenous in the promotion model but should be included in the retention model. This 
hypothesis is also the basis for the Heckman sample-selection models. 
ln (promote) = β0 + β1nrotc_r + β2nrotc_c + β3ocs + β4other_src + 
β5prior_enlisted + β6female + black + β8asian + β9other_race + 
β10single_with_child + β11married_no_child + β12married_with_child + 
β13post_grad + β17fiscal_years + ε 
The Heckman model is built on the hypothesis that officers who left before the O-
4 promotion board may be different in their promotion probabilities from those who 
stayed. The model first estimates the likelihood of staying in service, then predicts the 
probability of promotion as if we had observed the entire sample before the promotion 
board. The “Promote” and “Stay’ variables are two dichotomous variables for promotion 
and retention. Independent variables are same as simple probit models; the only 
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difference is that the retention model includes university majors, which are hypothesized 
to be endogenous for retention, but exogenous for the promotion model. 
ln (promote) = β0 + β1nrotc_r + β2Nrotc_c + β3ocs + β4other_src + 
β5prior_enlisted + β6female + black + β8asian + β9other_race + 
β10single_with_child + β11married_no_child + β12married_with_child + 
β13post_grad + β17fiscal_years + ε  selection ( ln (stay) = β0 + β1nrotc_r + 
β2Nrotc_c + β3ocs + β4other_src + β5prior_enlisted + β6female + black + 
β8asian + β9other_race + β10single_with_child + 
β11married_no_child + β12married_with_child + β13post_grad + 
β14life_medic_sci + β15phy_sci + β16hum_sci + β17mgt_econ + β17fiscal_years 
+ ε) 
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IV. MODEL RESULTS 
Three different models were utilized to analyze the retention and promotion 
performance of officers, as mentioned in the previous chapter. This chapter will present 
model results and interpret coefficients and their inferences. The models are significant, 
but the R-squares are relatively small. This is common in social science applied data 
work. 
A. THE PROBIT MODEL 
1. Retention 
Table 19 presents results from the retention model. Probit regression is used to 
find the contributions of each independent variable to retention. Since chi-square is very 
close to zero, the overall model significantly explains the probability of retaining. Due to 
missing values, only 5,052 observations are used in the model. The dependent variable is 
“stay”, which equals “1” if an officer stayed until the O-4 promotion board, and “0” 
otherwise. Commissioning sources include USNA, NROTC-regular, NROTC-contract, 
OCS, and “other sources.” USNA is the base variable for those groups. The base group 
for gender is male. The “prior_enlisted” variable equals 1 for officers who have previous 
enlisted service experience, and 0 otherwise. Race is divided four groups; white, black, 
Asian, and other_race. White is the base category for race. Marital status is divided into 
the following groups: single and childless, single with children, married and childless, 
and married with children. Singles without children are the base group for the marital-
status comparison. Educational background is coded to represent those officers with 
bachelor’s degrees and those with master’s. Officers with missing or unreported 
education levels were grouped under “no education level”, but none remained in the 
model because of missing values for other variables. Majors at college are hypothesized 
to be effective on retention, but not on promotion. This model includes five groups for 
majors: life and medical sciences, physical sciences, engineering majors, humanitarian 
sciences, management, and economic sciences. Engineering majors are used as the base 
category for discovering the effect of college majors on retention. 
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nrotc regular  0.2618  0.103  ‐0.0958  ‐0.0377 
   (0.0430)*** (0.0167)*** ‐0.0615  ‐0.0242 
nrotc contract  0.4038  0.1537  0.5927  0.2103 
   (0.1014)*** (0.0361)*** (0.1482)*** (0.0449)*** 
ocs  0.614  0.2288  0.3967  0.1495 
   (0.0668)*** (0.0224)*** (0.0932)*** (0.0332)*** 
other_src  0.3404  0.1316  ‐0.1887  ‐0.0747 
   (0.0652)*** (0.0242)*** (0.0878)**  (0.0349)** 
prior_enlisted  0.11  0.0435  0.1996  0.0771 
   (0.0588)*  (0.0231)*  (0.0820)**  (0.0310)** 
female  ‐0.3134  ‐0.1245  ‐0.3213  ‐0.1275 
   (0.0625)*** (0.0245)*** (0.1003)*** (0.0397)*** 
black  ‐0.0776  ‐0.0309  0.1403  0.0543 
   ‐0.0651  ‐0.026  ‐0.096  ‐0.0366 
asian  ‐0.1029  ‐0.041  0.0723  0.0282 
   ‐0.0949  ‐0.0379  ‐0.1424  ‐0.055 
other_race  0.0879  0.0347  ‐0.0175  ‐0.0069 
   ‐0.0784  ‐0.0308  ‐0.1066  ‐0.0419 
single_with_child  ‐0.1275  ‐0.0508  0.0533  0.0208 
   ‐0.1744  ‐0.0696  ‐0.2501  ‐0.097 
married_no_child  0.01  0.004  0.1129  0.044 
   ‐0.0414  ‐0.0164  (0.0594)*  (0.0230)* 
married_with_child  0.2059  0.0808  0.6629  0.2391 
   (0.0599)*** (0.0231)*** (0.0856)*** (0.0270)*** 
Post_Grad  0.0833  0.0329  ‐0.1219  ‐0.0482 
   ‐0.1459  ‐0.0573  ‐0.1991  ‐0.0793 
life_medic_sci  0.043  0.017       
   ‐0.0771  ‐0.0305       
phy_sci  0.0431  0.0171       
   ‐0.0555  ‐0.022       
hum_sci  ‐0.0057  ‐0.0023       
   ‐0.0448  ‐0.0178       
mgt_econ  ‐0.069  ‐0.0274       
   ‐0.0625  ‐0.0249       
_Ifiscal_ye_1995  0.0045  0.0018  ‐0.0623  ‐0.0245 
   ‐0.0745  ‐0.0296  ‐0.1041  ‐0.0411 
_Ifiscal_ye_1996  ‐0.0287  ‐0.0114  0.1544  0.0597 
   ‐0.076  ‐0.0302  ‐0.1074  ‐0.0408 
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_Ifiscal_ye_1997  ‐0.0442  ‐0.0176  0.0518  0.0202 
   ‐0.0768  ‐0.0306  ‐0.1087  ‐0.0423 
_Ifiscal_ye_1998  0.0118  0.0047  0.0545  0.0213 
   ‐0.0804  ‐0.0319  ‐0.1145  ‐0.0445 
_Ifiscal_ye_1999  0.1288  0.0508  0.1722  0.0665 
   ‐0.0789  (0.0308)*  ‐0.1082  ‐0.0409 
_Ifiscal_ye_2000  0.1202  0.0474  0.4267  0.1588 
   ‐0.0805  ‐0.0315  (0.1122)*** (0.0387)*** 
_Ifiscal_ye_2001  0.1814  0.0712  0.2281  0.0874 
   (0.0834)**  (0.0322)**  (0.1130)**  (0.0420)** 
_Ifiscal_ye_2002  ‐0.0797  ‐0.0317  0.4861  0.1778 
   ‐0.0889  ‐0.0354  (0.1316)*** (0.0434)*** 
_Ifiscal_ye_2003  0.0177  0.007  0.3984  0.148 
   ‐0.0929  ‐0.0368  (0.1358)*** (0.0467)*** 
_Ifiscal_ye_2004  ‐0.0553  ‐0.022  ‐0.1071  ‐0.0423 
   ‐0.0881  ‐0.0351  ‐0.1602  ‐0.0637 
Constant  ‐0.1373     ‐0.1572    
   (0.0657)**     (0.0867)*    
Observations  5052  5052  2580  2580 
              
Standard errors in parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
 
All coefficients for each commissioning source are statistically significant at the 
5% level and positive. This suggests that all commissioning sources have a higher 
retention than USNA. Examining the partial effects of commissioning sources, OCS is 
found to be the most effective source on retention. An OCS graduate is 22 percentage 
points more likely to stay until O-4 promotion board than an academy graduate. NROTC-
contract, other sources, and NROTC-regular follow OCS by 15, 13, and 10 percentage 
points, respectively. Note that these differences are between effects of each source on 
retention as compared to USNA. 
Having prior enlisted service is marginally significant at the 5% level. It increases 
the probability of staying to O-4 by 4%. Gender is also a significant variable on retention. 
Female officers are 12 percentage points less likely to stay in service than their male 
counterparts. Race variables are all insignificant, which means that race is not a 
contributing factor in retention, as compared to white officers. Moreover, using the Wald 
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test to analyze whether there is any difference among races other than comparing them to 
whites shows that there is no difference among races, either. 
Single officers who do not have children are used as the base group for marital 
and dependency status. Only officers who are married and have children present a 
difference from the base category. These officers are 8% more likely to stay in the service 
than officers who are single without children. Having a master’s degree is not significant 
in the model, which contradicts the hypothesis. Although it is not in the scope of this 
study, the underlying reason for this may be that officers who achieve a postgraduate 
degree will end up with a higher “reservation salary” and more opportunities in the 
civilian job market. 
Probit regression results also provide the predicted overall retention probability 
for the average officer. According to these estimates, the average officer is predicted to 
stay in the service until O-4 at 54% probability. “Average” here implies USNA 
graduates, male, white, single, childless, graduates with a bachelor’s in engineering, and 
without prior enlisted service. 
2. Promotion 
Promotion outcome is the dependent variable for the promotion probit model. It is 
a dichotomous variable that represents whether an officer is promoted at the O-4 
promotion board. All other independent variables are the same as those used in the 
retention probit model. The only difference is that college majors are not included in the 
promotion model because they are hypothesized to be exogenous to promotion outcome. 
Table 20 exhibits results for the promotion model, including the coefficients and 
marginal effects of each variable. Since chi-square is very close to zero, the overall model 
is robust. Due to missing values for variables, there remained 2,580 observations in the 
model. 
Comparing the effect of commissioning sources on promotion as compared to 
USNA, all variables are statistically significant at the 5% level, except NROTC-regular, 
which is marginally significant at 10%. These results entail that commissioning sources 
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have different effects on promotion outcome compared to USNA. Keeping other 
variables constant in the model, graduates from NROTC-regular and other sources are 
less likely to promote to O-4 compared to USNA, by -4 and -7 percentage points, 
respectively. On the other hand NROTC-contract and OCS graduates are more likely to 
promote than USNA graduates by 21 and 15 percentage points, respectively. Since we 
are taking promotion as a performance measure, NROTC-contract graduates are the best 
performers in the model, followed by OCS, USNA, NROTC-regular, and “other 
sources.” 
Having prior enlisted-service experience is significant and increases promotion 
probability by 7 percentage points. Gender is also significant at the 5% level. Female 
officers are 12 percentage points less likely to promote to O-4 than male officers. Many 
other studies have evidenced a gender gap. One cited reason is that females are more 
likely to leave because they are more likely to experience interrupted careers, mostly 
because of family responsibilities, and this decreases their chance to promote. As in the 
retention model, race is not significant in the promotion model, even at 10%, which 
implies that there is no correlation between getting promoted and race, holding other 
variables in the model constant. In addition, there is no difference between single officers 
in promotion, whether they have children or not. However, married officers are more 
likely to promote than single officers. Compared to single officers without children, this 
difference is 4 percentage points for married officers without children, and that variable is 
marginally significant at 5 percentage points. Married officers with children are most 
likely to promote by 24 percentage points difference in probability, compared to single 
officers without children, with 1% significance. Prior studies have observed this marriage 
premium (Bowman & Mehay, 1999). One hypothesis for this premium is that married 
employees tend to earn more and perform better than their single counterparts. One of the 
underlying reasons may be that married employees have a more stable and structured 
lifestyle, and that makes them more productive. Another reason may be that married 
people are more risk averse in work life and are more likely to secure their jobs. 
However, marriage may be endogenous to job performance, in that employees 
performing better in their “social life” are also performing better in their “work life”. 
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Holding a master’s degree has no significant effect on promotion. As stated in the 
retention section, this may imply that officers with a master’s degree have higher 
reservation salaries and have more job opportunities in civilian life. 
B. HECKMAN SELF-SELECTION MODEL 
Heckman’s self-selection model is utilized to investigate robustness of probit 
models. We assume that there may be self-selection bias in the retention and promotion 
models. Officers who are unlikely to promote may leave before the O-4 promotion board. 
It is likely that officers promoted to O-4 were those who were eligible to stay and more 
satisfied with their military carrier. These would also be the officers who are more 
productive and successful in the Navy. In other words, the simple probit model for 
“promotion” excludes officers that left the service before the O-4 promotion board, 
causing the simple model to suffer from sample selection bias. To mitigate that bias from 
research results, the Heckman self-selection model adjusts the estimates of the promotion 
model to reflect the entire population, not just those who survived until the promotion 
point. 
The Heckman model uses the same variables as in the probit models for retention 
and promotion. As in the probit retention model, college majors are hypothesized to be 
exogenous to promotion.  
The Heckman model uses 4,921 officers, 2,341 of whom are censored 
observations (those who left earlier than the promotion board) and 2,580 of whom are 
uncensored observations (those who appeared before the promotion board). The Wald 
chi-square test shows the robustness of the model by having a probability of zero. In 
addition, the likelihood ratio test indicates that the errors from both models are 
significantly correlated. In other words, there is sample-selection bias in the simple probit 
“promotion” model. 
Table 20 presents results for the Heckman regression. Among commissioning 
sources, NROTC-regular and “other sources” exhibit a significant difference from USNA 
in effect on promotion. NROTC-contract is marginally significant at 5% level. The OCS 
variable is not significant, which implies that OCS graduates do not have different 
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promotion probabilities than USNA graduates, keeping other variables constant. While 
NROTC-contract graduates are 5.7 percentage points more likely to promote than USNA 
graduates, NROTC-regular and “other sources” are less likely to receive promotion by 
6.7 and 11 percentage points, respectively. In other words, NROTC-contract graduates 
are most likely to promote. USNA and OCS graduates have a higher probability of 
promotion than the other two groups of commissioning sources, NROTC-regular and 
“other sources.” 









nrotc regular  ‐0.2175  ‐.0668  0.2812 
   (0.0475)*** (.015)***  (0.0436)*** 
nrotc contract  0.2069  .057  0.3472 
   (0.1237)*  (.0312)*  (0.1043)*** 
ocs  ‐0.0041  ‐.0012  0.6906 
   ‐0.0787  .0235  (0.0691)*** 
other_src  ‐0.34  ‐.1109  0.3525 
   (0.0684)*** (.024)***  (0.0652)*** 
prior_enlisted  0.0966  .028  0.0851 
   ‐0.0677  .0191  ‐0.0598 
female  0.034  .01  ‐0.3115 
   ‐0.0735  .0214  (0.0643)*** 
black  0.1616  .0456  ‐0.0748 
   (0.0755)**  (.0201)**  ‐0.0656 
asian  0.0975  .028  ‐0.0878 
   ‐0.1078  .0298  ‐0.0955 
other_race  ‐0.0713  ‐.0217  0.1016 
   ‐0.0848  .0264  ‐0.0785 
single_with_child  0.0922  .0265  ‐0.1223 
   ‐0.1959  .0543  ‐0.1747 
married_no_child  0.0617  .0182  ‐0.0016 
   ‐0.0458  .0133  ‐0.0418 
married_with_child 0.4149  .1084  0.175 
   (0.0727)*** (.0162)***  (0.0612)*** 
Post_Grad  ‐0.129  ‐.0402  0.0841 
   ‐0.1531  .0498  ‐0.1443 
life_medic_sci        0.1892 
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         (0.0645)*** 
phy_sci        0.0764 
         ‐0.0468 
hum_sci        0.0756 
         (0.0374)** 
mgt_econ        ‐0.0521 
         ‐0.0523 
_Ifiscal_ye_1995  ‐0.0525  ‐.0159  0.0385 
   ‐0.0795  .0244  ‐0.0745 
_Ifiscal_ye_1996  0.118  .0339  ‐0.0019 
   ‐0.0827  .0228  ‐0.0761 
_Ifiscal_ye_1997  0.0519  .0152  ‐0.0182 
   ‐0.083  .0239  ‐0.0772 
_Ifiscal_ye_1998  0.0059  .0017  0.0167 
   ‐0.0868  .0257  ‐0.0803 
_Ifiscal_ye_1999  0.0283  .0083  0.1389 
   ‐0.0848  .0248  (0.0791)* 
_Ifiscal_ye_2000  0.2039  .0568  0.1385 
   (0.0889)**  (.0230)**  (0.0805)* 
_Ifiscal_ye_2001  0.0298  .0088  0.1811 
   ‐0.0891  .026  (0.0833)** 
_Ifiscal_ye_2002  0.3582  .0937  ‐0.0901 
   (0.1025)*** (.023)***  ‐0.0889 
_Ifiscal_ye_2003  0.2552  .0693  ‐0.0059 
   (0.1060)**  (.0259)**  ‐0.0935 
_Ifiscal_ye_2004  0.1699  .0476  ‐0.5192 
   ‐0.1168  .0306  (0.0984)*** 
Constant  0.6719  0.6719  ‐0.207 
   (0.0659)*** (0.0659)***  (0.0644)*** 
Observations  4921  4921  4921 




Prior enlisted service and gender were two significant variables in the probit 
retention and promotion model. While prior enlisted experience has a positive 
contribution, being female has a negative contribution for both the probit promotion and 




characteristics become insignificant for promotion. It is concluded that while prior 
enlisted service experience and gender are effective in the decision to stay in the Navy, 
they are not a factor in promotion outcome. 
Race was insignificant in both probit retention and promotion models. In the 
Heckman model, only “black” is significant at 5% level. According to the Heckman 
model, African-American officers are 4.6 percentage points more likely to promote than 
their white counterparts. Being Asian or belonging to other races does not present any 
significant difference from being white. 
Marital and dependency status shows that only married officers with children are 
significantly different in promotion probabilities than childless singles. Their increase in 
probability of promotion is 10.8 percentage points. 
Having a postgraduate degree is not significant in the Heckman model, 
confirming the first two models. 
C. DOES THE SWO BONUS CHANGE THE TREND? 
Although this study was not intended to draw inferences from dummy-year 
variables in the models, one thing that caught our attention was the increasing 
significance of year variables after year 2000. This was a sign that something not 
controlled-for explicitly was affecting retention and promotion outcomes. Especially in 
the promotion model, the years 2000 though 2003 suggested an increased promotion 
probability by up to 17 percentage points. 
Assuming this may be the effect of the SWO bonus introduced in 2000, we ran a 
Chow test on pooled data. Officers were divided into two groups: before year 2000 and 
after 2000. Full-blown and modified Chow tests were utilized to see if there is structural 
change among retention and promotion outcomes over time. A dummy variable taking a 
value of “1” for year 2000 and above and “0” for years before 2000 was included. 




probit models.  For the full-blown Chow test, both this dummy and interaction terms 
were used in the probit model, whereas for the modified Chow model, the dummy was 
excluded. 

































Chi2  28.04 (18)  27.19 (17)  28.37 (14)  6.72 (13) 
Prob>Chi2  0.0615  0.0554  0.0127  0.9161 




Table 21 indicates that both the full-blown and modified Chow tests reject the 
probability of no change among retention outcomes between the two time periods for the 
retention model. This implies that the introduction of the SWO bonus significantly 
affected retention rates (at the 6% significance level). 
On promotion models, the modified Chow test found no evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis, which indicates that there is no difference between the two time periods 
in the effect of the explanatory variables. However, the full-blown Chow test was 
significant almost at the 1% level. The difference between these two tests infers that even 
though interaction terms did not change over time, the slope of intercept for the two time 
periods changed. It can be inferred that although original variables did not change in 
nature after the year 2000, some other structural changes created an increase in the 
promotion outcome. This could be due to the SWO bonus introduced in year 2000. 
Furthermore, it is inferred that even though retention rates did not change after 2000, 
promotion rates increased. It may be concluded that although the same number of officers 
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stayed in the Navy until O-4, there was an increase in the number of officers promoting 
to O-4. The bonus may have made officers work harder to be eligible to promote. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter presents regression results for retention and promotion and 
investigates whether the SWO bonus, introduced in 2000, has any effect on retention and 
promotion trends. It utilizes basic probit models for retention and promotion. This chapter 
also describes the Heckman probit model, presuming there may be a selection bias for the 
promotion model. The Chow test is used to investigate structural change that may have 
happened after 2000, the year the SWO bonus was introduced. 
Since there is a self-selection problem for the probit promotion model, Heckman 
model results are used instead of probit model results, as valid and robust results for 
promotion.  Results show that graduates of all other commissioning sources are more 
likely to stay in the Navy until O-4 promotion than USNA graduates. OCS graduates 
have the highest probability of retention, followed by NROTC-contract, “other sources,” 
and NROTC-regular. When they stay in the Navy until O-4 promotion time, NROTC-
contract graduates are most likely to promote, followed by USNA, OCS, NROTC-
regular, and “other sources.” 
The Chow test shows that the SWO bonus is most effective on retention but that it 
also boosted promotion rates among those who stayed.  
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This study analyzes the effect of commissioning programs on career progression 
for SWOs in the Navy. Retention and promotion were used as proxy measures to gauge 
officers’ performance through their careers, and the results were used to compare the 
average performance of officers from each commissioning program. Three multivariate 
regression models were constructed to investigate the relationship between 
commissioning source and officer performance, using retention and promotion to O-4 as 
performance measures. One probit model was utilized to predict the retention model, 
since the expected outcome is dichotomous. The retention model uses the “stay” variable 
as a dependent variable. Another probit model was utilized to predict probability of 
promotion to O-4. The dependent variable was binary and labeled as “promote.”  Since 
there is a self-selection problem for the promotion model, the Heckman correction model 
was used to determine the effect of commissioning sources on promotion. 
The data was acquired from Officer Master File via the Navy Econometric 
Modeling (NEM) online data system. It contained 10,295 observations. All observations 
were surface warfare officers who were before the promotion board between fiscal years 
1994 through 2009. There was no promotion granted after 2004, which meant that these 
officers were still serving their O-3 obligations. Thus, these observations were dropped 
from data. 
Due to missing values of variables, there remained 5,052 observations in the 
retention model. On average, officers are predicted to stay in the service until O-4, at 
54% probability. The average officer in our data is one who is a USNA graduate, male, 
white, and single without children, with a bachelor’s degree in engineering, and no prior 
enlisted service. Examining the partial effects of commissioning sources to find the 
magnitude of effect, OCS is the most effective source on retention. An OCS graduate is 
22 percentage points more likely to stay until O-4 promotion board than a USNA 
graduate. NROTC-contract, “other sources,” and NROTC-regular follow OCS by 15 
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percentage points, 13 percentage points, and 10 percentage points, respectively. Note that 
these differences are between the effects of each source on retention as compared to 
USNA. 
In regard to the promotion data sample, due to missing values for variables, there 
remained 2,580 observations in the probit model. Comparing the effect of commissioning 
sources on promotion against that of USNA, all variables are statistically significant at 
the 5% level, except NROTC-regular, which is marginally significant at the 10% level. 
These results indicate that commissioning sources have different effects on promotion 
outcome compared to USNA. Keeping other variables constant in the model, graduates 
from NROTC-regular and other sources are less likely to promote to O-4, as compared to 
USNA, by -4 percentage points and -7 percentage points respectively. On the other hand, 
NROTC-contract and OCS graduates are more likely to promote than USNA graduates, 
by 21 percentage points and 15 percentage points respectively. 
As for the Heckman correction model, this model used 4,921 officers, 2,341 of 
whom are censored observations (those who left earlier than promotion board) and 2,580 
of whom are uncensored (those who appeared before promotion board). According to this 
model, among commissioning sources, NROTC-regular and “other sources” exhibit a 
significant difference from USNA on effect on promotion. NROTC-contract is 
marginally significant at the 5% level. The OCS variable is not significant, which implies 
that OCS graduates do not have different promotion probabilities than USNA graduates, 
keeping other variables constant. While NROTC-contract graduates are 5.7 percentage 
points more likely to promote than USNA graduates, NROTC-regular and “other 
sources” are less likely to receive promotion, by 6.7 percentage points and 11 percentage 
points, respectively. In other words, when staying in the Navy until O-4 promotion time, 
NROTC-contract graduates are most likely to promote, followed by USNA, OCS, 
NROTC-regular and “other sources.” Since there is a self-selection problem in the probit 
model, Heckman model results were considered as valid and robust. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
The retention model was constructed to analyze the effect of commissioning 
sources on retention after the MSR. USNA being the base commissioning source in the 
model, all coefficients for each commissioning source are statistically significant at 5% 
level and positive. According to the results, OCS graduates are more likely to stay than 
officers commissioned from other sources. If they are ranked in terms of retention, 
NROTC-contract, “other sources,” NROTC-regular and USNA follow OCS. Having 
prior enlisted service is marginally significant and it increases the probability of staying 
to O-4. Most of the other explanatory variables were found to be statistically significant. 
The findings of demographic variables suggest that female, single, without-child officers 
are less likely to stay than male, married, with-child officers, respectively. Race variables 
are all insignificant, which means that race is not a contributing factor to retention. 
Among the independent variables that represent the professional and educational 
background of individuals, master's degrees or above were found to be insignificant, 
which contradicts our hypothesis. No college major presented any difference compared to 
engineering majors. 
The Heckman promotion-model results indicate statistically significant effects of 
the commissioning source on promotion to O-4. According to the findings, officers 
commissioned through NROTC-contract have the highest probability of promotion. 
USNA and OCS graduates have a higher probability of promotion than the other two 
groups of commissioning sources, NROTC-regular and “other sources.” Namely, when 
remaining in the Navy until O-4 promotion time, NROTC-contract graduates are most 
likely to promote, followed by USNA, OCS, NROTC-regular, and “other sources.” 
After controlling for sample selection in the Heckman model, prior enlisted 
service experience and gender become insignificant for promotion. We conclude that 
while these two characteristics are effective in the decision to stay in the Navy, they are 
not a factor in promotion. African-American officers are more likely to promote than 
their white counterparts. Being Asian or belonging to other races does not present any 
significant difference from being white. Marital and dependency status show that only 
married officers who have children are significantly different in promotion probabilities; 
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they are more likely to promote than those who are single and childless. Having a 
postgraduate degree is not significant in the Heckman model, like the first two models. 
The analysis of all three multivariate regression models indicates that 
commissioning source is a significant determinant of retention and promotion for the SW 
community. Contrary to the initial assumption, while OCS graduates have the highest 
probability of staying in the SW community, USNA graduates have the lowest 
probability. Although USNA graduates were initially expected to have higher promotion 
rates, the results suggest that they are less likely to promote to the grade of O-4 than 
officers commissioned through NROTC-contract graduates. However, they have a higher 
probability of promotion than officers from OCS, NROTC-regular, and “other sources.” 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since this study only focused on the SWO community, generalization of the 
results for the whole Navy may not be a good approach. The initial assumptions were 
made according to prior studies on the Navy and this study’s results show that the effects 
of most retention and promotion determinants can change according to Navy community. 
According to the findings of this thesis, for retention, OCS and NROTC-contract 
graduates seem to perform better than officers commissioned through other programs. As 
for promotion, NROTC-contract and USNA graduates perform better than the other 
sources. Hence, the Navy may consider increasing the mix of officers commissioned 
through NROTC-contract, USNA, and OCS for the SW community. On the other hand, 
since the cost of producing one additional officer also plays a key role in determining the 
mix of officers, a cost-effectiveness analysis should be performed as a comparison factor 
to fully analyze the optimal officer mix. Additionally, since officer quality is crucial and 
USNA provides a more comprehensive and quality education, this issue should also be 
considered. 
Due to the lack of required data elements, some variables such as “fitness 
reports,” “officer-evaluation reports,” “performance at schools,” “graduate GPA,” and 
“deployment info” could not be included as explanatory variables in this study. In future 
research, controlling for these variables may improve the robustness of the results. 
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Further studies may investigate the effects of commissioning sources on 
promotion to O-5 to check whether these results remain the same. Moreover, studies may 
be conducted to analyze other communities of the Navy, as to whether these communities 
differ in terms of retention and promotion. 
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